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GATT AND NAFTA
I. EVOLUTION OF THE TRIPS NEGOTIATIONS
A. Logic of a Trade-Based Initiative
Three propositions underlie the developed countries' drive for
strengthened intellectual property rights within the framework of
multilateral trade negotiations, known as the Uruguay Round, to
revise the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"):'
(1) Strong intellectual property rights exert an unreservedly
positive influence on developed free-market economies;2
(2) Strong intellectual property rights benefit all countries
regardless of their present stage of development; 3
(3) The acquisition of non-indigenous technologies by de-
veloping countries other than by imports or license usually
constitutes an illicit economic loss to the technology export-
ing countries.4
1. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [here-
inafter GAIT, BISD]; Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, GAT Doc. MIN. DEC.
No. 86-1572 (Sept. 20, 1986), reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GAIT, III.
A.3, at 25 (Kenneth R. Simmonds & Brian H.W. Hill eds., 1992); see also A. Jane
Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay
Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Richard P. Rozek, Protection of Intellectual Property Through Licensing:
Efficiency Considerations, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 28-30 (Oct. 1988); Eric Wolfhard,
International Trade in Intellectual Property: The Emerging GAIT Regime, 49 U. TO-
RONTO FAC. L. REV. 106, 114-15 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual
Property Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75, 77-90 (Oct. 1990);
Wolfhard, supra note 2, at 115-18; Robert M. Sherwood, Why A Uniform Intellectual
Property System Makes Sense for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68-88 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al.
eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. See also
ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 191-99
(1990).
4. See, e.g., Emery Simon, U.S. Trade Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, 50
ALB. L. REV. 501, 501 (1986) ("[W]hen products are pirated from foreign markets, they
reduce United States exports to those markets."); Jacques J. Gorlin, GATT-A View from
the United States, 5 CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 275 (1989); Wolfhard, supra note 2,
at 128-30 (stating that "piracy" decreases innovators' returns, affects investment incen-
tives, and allows free-riders to "capture the rents and markets of intellectual property
19931
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The first two propositions are counter-intuitive and neither
historical experience nor the literature supports them.5 The social
costs and relative efficiencies of intellectual property regimes re-
main the subject of continuing debate within the industrialized
countries even today, and some conservative economists still main-
tain that a products market unfettered by intellectual property rights
would attain greater efficiency than at present. 6 On the whole, a
consensus probably exists that industrialized societies are better off
with established intellectual property regimes than without them.
But there is no consensus concerning the levels of efficiency
achieved by any particular regime, and considerable evidence sug-
gests that all extant regimes yield serious inefficiencies under some
circumstances. Opinions about the proper balance between the
incentives of protection and the benefits of competition vary from
country to country and from epoch to epoch within particular coun-
tries, and variations in attitude are especially prominent when shifts
exporters without facing any of the risks"; and characterizing state-sanctioned piracy as
a de facto producer subsidy). See also J.H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Signi-
ficance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL
CONFLICT (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
5.. See, e.g., JUDITH C. CHIN & GENE M. GROSSMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND NORTH-SOuTH TRADE 105-06 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 1490, 1990); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Guidance from Economic
Theory, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES-A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 17, 32 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck. ed., 1990)
[hereinafter STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] ("Overall, economic theory has
raised more questions about welfare implications of intellectual property than it has
answered."); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case for and Against
Intellectual Property Protection, in STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra, at
69, 80-81 (concluding that "the protection of intellectual property rights is considered by
most authorities to be neither necessary nor sufficient for strong technological activity").
See also A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development:
Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (1987); Arvind Subramanian, The International
Economics of Intellectual Property Protection; A Welfare-Theoretic Trade Policy Analysis,
19 WORLD DEV. 945, 947, 951-52 (1991).
6. See, e.g., ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 15-25 (1987) (citing authorities on both sides); Tom G.
Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 855-61 (1990); Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
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in the business cycle occur.7
As regards the third proposition, that gains from unlicensed
uses of foreign technologies in developing countries characteristi-
cally represent illicit losses to entrepreneurs in developed countries,
this residual mercantilist attitude conflicts with the underlying com-
petitive ethos from which intellectual property rights derogate and
with the territorial nature of these derogations.' Basic norms of
free competition established in the nineteenth century often induced
territorial legislators to provide relatively weak forms of intellectual
property protection; the standards of protection currently prevailing
in developing countries often resemble those applied in the devel-
oped world not too long ago.9 Weak intellectual property laws
ensure access to markets for second comers who provide cheaper
and better products through imitation and incremental innovation.
7. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on
Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLEC-
TUJAL PROPERTY, supra note 3, at 107-45; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Re-
turns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTiv-
iTY 783, 784-88 (1987); Harms Ullrich, GAIT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair
Trade and Development, in GAIT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 138-42 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard
Schricker eds., 1989). See also Mark F. Grady & Jay Alexander, Patent Law and Rent
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308-10 (1992). In the U.S. prior to 1975, the federal
appellate courts tended to invalidate most issued patents that reached them on appeal.
The invalidation rate before the United States Supreme Court was so high that it prompted
one Justice to exclaim that the only valid patent was one that the Court had not laid its
hands on. These tendencies led Congress to establish a specialized jurisdiction for patent
appeals, known as the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which took
office in 1982. See, e.g., David Silverstein, Patents, Science, and Innovation: Historical
Linkages and Implications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 268-70, 307-12 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nine-
teenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950); see generally J.H. Reichman, Intellectual
Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 769-90 (1989) ("Nonexistence of an International Norm
Against Misappropriation") [hereinafter Reichman, GAIT Connection].
9. See, e.g., Alberto Bercovitz-Rodriguez, Historical Trends in Protection of Technol-
ogy in Developed Countries and Their Relevance for Developing Countries, Study pre-
pared for U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITP/
TEC/18 (Dec. 26, 1990); David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property
Rights: The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 905 (1989).
1993]
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Innovators who fail to qualify for protection under these laws can
rely only on such factors as lead time, reputation for quality, and
continuing technical improvements to maintain their foothold in the
market.
Undermining this classical nineteenth century outlook are two
recent developments that lead directly to the inclusion of interna-
tional intellectual property issues within the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. First, the rise of information-based
technologies altered the nature of competition and disrupted the
equilibrium that had resulted from more traditional comparative
advantages. Because such technologies are inherently vulnerable
to rapid appropriation by free-riders who do not share in the costs
of research and development, innovators demand both domestic and
international measures to protect their investments."° Second, the
growing capacity of manufacturers in developing countries to pene-
trate distant markets for traditional industrial products has forced
the developed countries to rely more heavily on their comparative
advantages in the production of intellectual goods than in the past.
Market access for developing countries thus became a bargaining
chip to be exchanged for greater protection of intellectual goods
within a restructured global marketplace.11
These tensions largely account for the developed countries'
demands for extraterritorial protection of intellectual property
rights, which aim to curb free-riding practices seldom illegal under
existing international law, and for unilateral trade sanctions that
both the United States and the European Communities have exerted
10. See, e.g., Paulo Roberto de Almeida, The "New" Intellectual Property Regime
and Its Economic Impact on Developing Countries, in LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT 74-76 (Giorgio Sacerdoti
ed., 1990) [hereinafter LIBERALIZATION IN THE URUGUAY ROUND]; J.H. Reichman,
Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protec-
tion for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 656-92 (1989)
[hereinafter Reichman, Programs as Know-How].
11. See, e.g., Hartridge & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 895-96; Friedl Weiss, TRIPS
in Search of an Itinerary: Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay




against countries that tolerate such practices." The paradox posed
by these demands and the resistance they elicit has been character-
ized in the following terms:
On the one hand, the industrialized countries that subscribe
to free-market principles at home want to impose a highly
regulated market for intellectual goods on the rest of the
world, one in which authors and inventors may "reap where
they have sown." On the other hand, the developing coun-
tries that restrict free competition at home envision a totally
unregulated world market for intellectual goods, one in
which "competition is the lifeblood of commerce."'13
The resolution of this paradox lies in the gradual integration of
international intellectual property law into the larger framework of
international economic law. This project, however, requires a ne-
gotiated balancing of private and public interests valid for all states
active in the international economic system.14  Since 1986, the
developed countries' drive for high international standards has
largely ignored the competitive capabilities of developing countries
with respect to intellectual goods. It has also downplayed both the
developing countries' rights to differential and more favorable
treatment under existing GATT rules and the willingness of these
same countries to address the principle of "adequate and effective
protection" of intellectual property rights in a manner consistent
with their real economic capabilities.' 5
12. See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property
Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 292-306 (1991); Alan 0.
Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The
Limited Case for Section 301, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 263 (1992). See generally
EDWARD S. YAMBRUSIC, TRADE-BASED APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 29-43, 53-70, 189-274.
13. Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 795-96.
14. See, e.g., Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, Transfer of Technology, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 691, 694-95 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991);
Fr&lric Benech, La place du droit de la proprigtd intellectuelle dans le droit interna-
tional dconomique, 22 REVUE GtNIRALE DE DROIT [REV. GtN.] 423 (1991).
15. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), Trade and Development
Report, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/1 1, 179,180, 192-93 (1991) [hereinafter UNCTAD Re-
port 1991]; infra note 351 and accompanying text.
1993]
178 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
At the same time, the logic of multilateral trade negotiations
skews the pre-existing North-South conflict over intellectual prop-
erty rights by introducing the prospects of trade concessions in
unrelated fields. Trade negotiations enable developed countries to
compensate developing countries for the social costs of an Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS" or "Draft TRIPS Agreement" or "Draft Agreement") by
increased market access, notably in agriculture and textiles.'" Such
a "package deal" would presumably suspend unilateral trade sanc-
tions against developing countries in favor of improved dispute-
settlement procedures within the larger context of a revised GATT
instrument.17
B. Scope of the Present Inquiry
This Article does not assess the relative costs and benefits of
the Uruguay Round's proposed package deal, which affects many
16. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institu-
tions, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 13 (1992) (viewing agriculture and textiles as trade-offs
for services and intellectual property rights); UNCTAD Report 1991, supra note 15, at
168-73 (predicting long-term opportunity for developing countries to expand agricultural
exports, but noting production lags likely to cause short-term problems); infra text accom-
panying notes 340-41. Attention must also be paid to the effects of other components of
a package deal likely to emerge from the Uruguay Round on the overall prospects of the
developing countries. See infra notes 17-18; see generally Symposium, Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (pts. 1 & 2), 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 689
(1989).
17. "It is indeed hard to see why many states should accept new multilateral commit-
ments in this area if they remain vulnerable to unilateral actions." Hartridge &
Subramanian, supra note 9, at 909. For a formal commitment to this effect, see Draft Fi-
nal Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [submitted by former GATT Director-
General Arthur Dunkel and sometimes known as the "Dunkel Draft" but hereinafter cited
as Draft Final Act], Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade In Counterfeit Goods (Annex III), preamble and arts. 64, 68-69, 71
[hereinafter Draft TRIPS Agreement]; Draft Final Act, supra, § S, Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes under Articles XXII and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. 1.1, 1.2, 21.1, 21.2 [hereinafter
Draft Understanding on Disputes]. See also Legal Drafting Group, Review of Individual
Texts in the Draft Final Act (Informal Note by the GAIT Secretariat, June 24, 1992)




different sectors of international trade.'8 Nor does it evaluate the
likelihood that the developed countries will in fact provide suffi-
cient concessions to offset any competitive disadvantages that a
TRIPS component might entail. Officials on both sides of the
Atlantic privately declare that if the enhanced market access al-
ready agreed by the negotiators were delivered without more, the
developing countries would benefit. Yet, spokesmen for the devel-
oping countries claim that the economic benefits so far offered to
their countries would not offset the combined social costs of the
package deal outlined in the Draft Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of 'the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
("Draft Final Act"). t9
On the assumption that the parties will negotiate a package deal
in the end, the Draft TRIPS component reviewed in this Article
represents a more balanced and positive achievement than appeared
likely to emerge from the bombastic rhetoric that accompanied the
preliminary negotiations. 0 If the United States has retreated from
initial efforts to impose its domestic intellectual property laws on
the rest of the world,21 the developing countries have abandoned
radical efforts to cut back on minimum standards of protection that
18. See generally Jeffrey J. Schott, The Uruguay Round: What Can Be Achieved?,
in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GAIT
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 1, 8-50 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990) [hereinafter COMPLETING THE
URUGUAY ROUND]; Developments and Issues in the Uruguay Round of Particular Con-
cern to Developing Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/39(2)/CRP. 1 (Note by the UNCTAD
Secretariat, Mar. 15, 1993) [hereinafter UNCTAD Note 1993].
19. See, e.g., UNCTAD Note 1993, supra note 18, at 4-5 (expressing misgivings);
Draft Final Act, supra note 17. For the complexities of the market access negotiations,
see COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE [IPC], KEIDANREN, UNICE,
BASIC FRAMEWORK OF GAT1 PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATEMENT
OF VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN, JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS COMMUNITIES
(1988); Administration's Statement on Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Abroad, Draft Bill Entitled "Intellectual Property Rights Improvement Act of 1986," and
Section-by-Section Analysis of Draft Bill, Released by Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, April 7, 1986, reprinted in 31 Pat. Trademark & Copyright-J. (BNA) 506 (Apr, 10,
1986); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 751-53 (citing other authorities).
21. See, e.g., United States Proposal for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG/1 l/W/14 (Oct. 20, 1987), re-
printed- in 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 667 (Oct. 29, 1987).
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the international intellectual property system has long accepted.22
The strengths of the Draft Agreement as it stands at the time of
writing lie in a core set of relatively well-established norms whose
past effects are known, while its weakest features consist of some
untried, stopgap provisions, a few serious lacunae, and lots of loop-
holes.23
This Article analyzes main provisions of the Draft Agreement
and explores the kind of competitive environment that both devel-
oping and developed countries would find themselves operating in
should a package deal that included a TRIPS component emerge
from the Uruguay Round. Based largely on the findings of a study
this investigator prepared for the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), 24 the present article sug-
gests that the developing countries would have to work harder to
compete generally, and to acquire technological innovation specifi-
cally, in a post-TRIPS environment. If, however, entrepreneurs in
developing countries successfully emulate the strategies of small-
22. See, e.g., Ludwig Baeumer, Le contexte de la rdvision de la Convention de Paris,
in L'INSTITrrT DE RECHERCHE EN PROPRIITI INTELLECTUELLE HENRI DESBOIS [I.R.P.I.],
VERS UNE EROSION DU DROIT DES BREVETS D'INVENTION?, NAIROBI 1981, at 7-20
(1982); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The Revision of the International System of Patent
Protection in the Interest of Developing Countries, 10 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPY-
RIGHT L. [I.I.C.] 649 (1979); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 817 n.315.
23. Because this article focuses on the Draft TRIPS Agreement as it stands at the
time of writing, it tends to ignore higher standards of protection likely to emerge from
parallel negotiations concerning the harmonization of patents and copyrights generally or
from regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") in particular. See, e.g., HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION-BY
TREATY OR DOMESTIC REFORM (1993); Ralph Oman, Berne Revision: The Continuing
Drama, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 139 (1993); Emery Simon, GATT
and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 267 (1993). For the text of the intellectual property component in the proposed
NAFTA Agreement, see TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND MANAGEMENT DIv., U.N.
DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, app. II, at 75-98, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/24, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.II.A.10 (1993) [hereinafter IPRs and FDI] ("Chapter XVII of the Proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement, as of September, 1992-Intellectual Property," Articles
1701-1718.4).
24. See J.H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Developing
Countries as Competitors in an Integrated World Market, U.N. Conference on Trade &
Dev. (UNCTAD) discussion paper N6-73, UNCTAD Doc. OSG/DP/73 (Nov. 1993).
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and medium-sized firms in developed countries, any competitive
efforts that secure a foothold in the global market, and any effec-
tive transfer of technology achieved in the process, would probably
yield greater and more lasting returns than at present.
This Article also considers why neither the developed countries
as a group, nor the United States in particular, should expect to
reap a painless bonanza from the TRIPS undertaking. Although
some developed countries may benefit more than others, all will
feel the social costs of strengthened protection for intellectual prop-
erty rights pinching some sectors of their respective economies. In
the worldwide market for intellectual goods likely to evolve from
a TRIPS Agreement, moreover, alliances between competitors hav-
ing common interests will increasingly transcend national bound-
aries. 5 As the participating countries become more interdependent,
national oligopolies will wield less control over future negotiations
than they have in the Uruguay Round, and individual states will
find it harder to speak with a single pro- or anticompetitive voice.
The TRIPS Agreement could thus give rise to an irreversible,
ongoing process of multilateral consultations from which there will
be no turning back.26 If so, single states engaged in this process
will progressively forfeit more and more sovereignty over the for-
mulation of domestic intellectual property norms, a result likely to
disconcert some of today's most ardent promoters of a trade-based
approach to international intellectual property law.




The failure to revise the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property ("Paris Convention") after 1967 largely reflects
a conflict between the demands of the developed countries for
higher international standards of protection and the developing
25. See infra text accompanying notes 365-71.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 324-41.
19931
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countries' efforts to weaken the norms adopted consensually in
previous revisions.27 The Draft TRIPS Agreement resolves this
conflict in favor of the developed countries by mandating the, ex-
tension of patentability to virtually all fields of technology recog-
nized in developed patent systems; by prolonging patent protection
for a uniform term of twenty years; and by securing legal recogni-
tion of the patentee's exclusive right to import the relevant prod-
ucts. 28  The Draft Agreement further requires member states to
protect products obtained directly from a patented process,2 9 and it
makes "patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced., 30 Even those member countries that
had not yet adhered to the Paris Convention, notably India, would
have to respect its substantive provisions in the future.31
The developing countries' rights to defer implementation of
these provisions vary with the relative economic capacity of the
country concerned and with the subject matter at issue. All devel-
oping countries obtain a five-year transition period during which
they need not conform domestic laws to the proposed international
minimum standards. For the least-developed countries ("LDCs"),
this blanket exemption lasts ten years and may be extended as
circumstances require.3 2
27. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised, Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 US.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention]; see also Jean Foyer, Problmes internationaux contemporains des
brevets d'invention, 171 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
[R.C.A.D.I.] 340, 378-401 (1981); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 761-66,
816-18; Baeumer, supra note 22, at 7-20.
28. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 27, 28, 33 & 34.
29. Id. art. 28(1)(b); see also id. art. 34(1) (reversing the burden of proof in actions
for the infringement of process patents).
30. Id. art, 27(1).
31. Id. art. 2(1) (requiring compliance with Paris Convention, supra note 27, arts. I-
12, 19). See also J~rg Reinbothe & Anthony Howard, The State of Play in the Negotia-
tions on Trips (GATT/Uruguay Round), 13 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R.] 157, 158-
59 (1991).
32. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 65(1), (2) (allowing developing
countries a five-year transitional period in general), 66 (ten-year exemption requiring
LDCs to provide only national treatment and MFN treatment and to comply with any
WIPO undertakings previously incurred). In appropriate circumstances, LDCs may also
[Vol. 4:171
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Nevertheless, one year after the Draft TRIPS Agreement takes
effect, all participating countries must forego patent regulations that
discriminate against foreigners. 33 The Draft Agreement also incor-
porates a Most-Favored Nation ("MFN") principle for intellectual
property rights analogous to the MFN principle that the GATT has
always applied to goods.34 This provision will limit the ability of
single countries to cut preferential bilateral deals with other coun-
tries unless both sides agree to extend the intellectual property
regulations in question to. their other trading partners.
Developing countries that did not previously afford patent pro-
tection to certain product categories, especially food, chemical, and
pharmaceutical products, need not formally change their eligibility
requirements for a period of ten years. 35  Whether a "pipeline"
clause will nonetheless require some interim protection of patent-
able pharmaceutical and agricultural products in existence at the
time a TRIPS Agreement enters into force remains to be clarified.36
try to invoke safeguards elsewhere provided in the Draft Final Act. See, e.g., Draft Final
Act, supra note, 17, § B, Measures in Favor of Least-DevelopedCountries, art. I (excusing
individual obligations inconsistent with development, financial, and trade needs or institu-
tional capabilities); Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, art. 22 (Special
Procedures involving Least-Developed Contracting Parties). Cf. Reichman, GATT Con-
nection, supra note 8, at 880-83 ("A negotiated, two-tiered regime ... could provide a
gradualist approach that takes account of each developing country's particular situation.").
33. Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 3-5, 65(2). National treatment is
expressly required by Article 3 and tacitly by Article 2, which incorporates national
treatment provisions of the Paris and Berne Conventions. See also Thomas Cottier, The
Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383, 397-98
(1991) (noting that the "conceptual difference of directly protecting rightholders, not
goods, excludes broad reference to Articles I and III of GAIT' and concluding that the
national treatment clause in Article 3 of the Draft TRIPS Agreement "should produce the
same effect as Article 2 of the Paris Convention and Article 3 of the Berne Convention").
34. Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 4 ("With regard to the protection of
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a PARTY
to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the nationals of all other PARTIES."). See also Cottier, supra note 33, at 398-99
(noting that MFN had hot previously been applied to international intellectual property
relations).
35. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 65(1), (2), (4).
36. Although the Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 70(8), (9), contains
such a provision, some commentators suggest that it has not proved politically viable.
See, e.g., Reinbothe & Howard, supra note 31, at 160 (suggesting that the present text is
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Important as the various transitional measures may be, all de-
veloping countries whose existing patent laws fall below the pro-
posed international standards must, sooner or later, prepare to im-
plement the Draft TRIPS Agreement if they intend to participate in
the final outcome of the Uruguay Round.37 It, therefore, becomes
logical to predict all the adverse consequences long associated with
the dependent role of the developing countries in the international
patent system. These consequences include increased royalty pay-
ments to foreign innovators; the corresponding loss of investment
opportunities in domestic research and development; higher prices
for consumer products subject to monopoly rights; and greater
dependence on imports in general. On the bleakest view, a devel-
oping country stands to gain only when a foreign invention affords
solutions of particular local utility that would not otherwise obtain
sufficient investment in research and development.38
These predictions capture only the static dimension of a world-
wide economic adjustment that could evolve in far more positive
directions. For example, enhanced market access flowing from the
Uruguay Round's Final Act should provide new economic opportu-
nities that compensate for the social costs of particular undertak-
ings. Disregarding trade concessions as such, policymakers should
not automatically assume that because stronger patent norms bene-
fit the industrialized countries, they would harm the developing
countries to a comparable degree. Some studies have found a cor-
relation even in developing countries between an increase in for-
eign patent applications and the level of domestic economic devel-
out of date); Simon, supra note 23, at 278-79 (viewing NAFTA's "pipeline" provisions
as a significant improvement on TRIPS). Should the pipeline provisions of Article 70(8)
nonetheless be adopted, their interrelation with the blanket exemptions for both develop-
ing and least-developed countries will require clarification.
37. See Draft Final Act, supra note 17, § A, 5 (permitting only acceptance of the
instruments as a whole).
38. See, e.g., Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property
Rights and the GATT: A View From the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 251-60
(1989); de Almeida, supra note 10, at 80-93; Subramanian, supra note 5, at 946-47, 951-
52. See also Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 18, at 164, 168-69; Arman S. Kirim, Reconsidering Patents and
Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry, 13
WORLD DEV. 219 (1985).
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opment.39 The actual competitive status of any given developing
country in a post-TRIPS universe will depend in part on the level
of direct or indirect foreign investment these norms help to foster
and on the benefits that improved intellectual property rights may
bring to domestic innovators. 40 Net social costs will also depend
on the willingness of domestic entrepreneurs generally to adopt
strategies practiced by smaller firms in industrialized countries who
must routinely compete with better organized, more powerful cor-
porations.
2. A Range of Strategic Responses
Because patents retard imitation but do not eliminate it,41 com-
petition under stronger patent regimes invites developing countries
to adopt legal means of narrowing the scope of foreign patent mo-
nopolies and of encouraging local entrepreneurs either to work
around the claimed inventions or to develop novel improvements
suited to local conditions. In the long term, familiarization with
the benefits of the system should stimulate greater investment in
domestic research and development and should encourage local
companies to develop their own intellectual property.42
39. See, e.g., Siegfried Greif, Patents and Economic Growth, 18 I.I.C. 191, 206-07,
211-12 (1987); Joseph Straus, Biotechnology and Its International Legal and Economic
Implications, Study prepared for U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), at 32
(Jan. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Primo Braga, supra note 38, at 257. See also Maskus, supra note 38,
at 165, 168 (economic effects of higher intellectual property protection are subtly linked
to market structure and to overall trade and industrial policies, though developing coun-
tries start from a disadvantaged position). In general, intellectual property rights consti-
tute but one of many variables that bear on competitive capacity and the transfer of
technology. See, e.g., IPRs and FDI, supra note 23, at 3-5; see also Mansfield, supra
note 7, at 111-14; John H. Dunning, Toward an Eclectic Theory of International Produc-
tion: Some Empirical Tests, 11 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 9 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology and Economic
Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE-INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 17, 22-27 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole
Ganz Brown eds., 1990) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS].
42. See, e.g., R.E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights and the Third World, 5
E.I.P.R. 330, 331-32 (1983); Frances Stewart, Technology Transfer for Development, in
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 301, 322-23 (R.E.
Evenson & G. Ranis eds., 1990).
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While local patent authorities could not just dismiss internation-
ally recognized determinations of patent validity without justifica-
tion, they are entitled to exercise all of the claims limitations prac-
ticed abroad and to know the results of prior invalidation proceed-
ings at the administrative or judicial levels. To this end, Article 29
of the Draft TRIPS Agreement allows administrators to require a
prospective patentee "to provide information concerning his corre-
sponding foreign applications and grants. 4 3 Even though the Paris
Convention renders each nation's patent-granting process indepen-
dent of similar processes elsewhere, 44 nothing prevents developing-
country administrators from exercising their own judgment in these
matters based on all the available evidence.
The scope of patent protection varies from country to country,
and no detailed international minimum standards apply. Formally,
attaining the same technical result by essentially the same means
should constitute infringement within Article 28 of the Draft
Agreement.45 The level of competition in any given field will
nonetheless depend on the range of equivalents extended to cutting-
edge patents. Improvements that lie outside the coverage of the
initial claims may be independently owned and exploited.a
While a patent harmonization treaty could eventually require
developed countries to practice a broadened doctrine of equiva-
lents,47 countries such as Japan and even Germany have traditional-
ly recognized only a narrow range of equivalents in order to stimu-
late local efforts to work around issued patents.4a The Draft TRIPS
43. Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 29(2).
44. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 4"'.
45. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 28 (Rights Conferred).
46. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Grady & Alexander, supra note 7.
47. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 23, at 24-26, 192-214.
48. See, e.g., Evenson, supra note 42, at 331-32; Alan S. Gutterman, International
Intellectual Property: A Summary of Recent Developments and Issues for the Coming
Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 335, 344-45, 348-49 (1992) (not-
ing that narrow doctrine of equivalents under past Japanese law encouraged local firms
to file applications that varied only slightly from the foreign application, which promoted
cross-licensing in order to avoid infringement actions). However, national treatment
provisions of both the Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3, and the Paris Con-
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Agreement leaves this topic largely unattended, except for certain
limitations on dependent patents in the technical sense.4 9 Courts
and administrators in developing countries, by strict interpretation
of equivalents, can therefore encourage local adaptations and im-
provements within limits.
Developing countries can also incorporate a broad experimental
use exception into their domestic patent laws without violating
express provisions of the Draft TRIPS Agreement.50 The Japanese
patent law appears to have favored this exception, which prevents
patentees from impeding a certain amount of noncommercial re-
verse engineering for purposes of advancing scientific research.5
Above all, the international patent system continues to mandate
disclosure of issued patents, and it also requires explanations of the
best mode for practicing an invention known to the inventor at the
time of filing.52 Under the first-to-file system used nearly every-
where except the United States, all patent applications are pub-
lished after eighteen months, whether or not the patents issue.53
Moreover, the Draft TRIPS Agreement does not require developing
countries to recognize a novelty grace period, as distinct from the
priority period required under the Paris Convention. 4 The lack of
a grace period enables alert entrepreneurs in countries where no
timely application has been filed to exploit technical disclosures
published in other countries.
In effect, the disclosure requirements constitute a vehicle for
direct acquisition of foreign technological knowledge. Potential
competitors in developing countries who monitor information flow-
ing from the international patent system will find it easier to work
around or to improve foreign inventions.55 As the foreign paten-
vention, which is incorporated by reference, must be respected.
49. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 28, 31(1).
50. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Shigeru Miki, Reverse Engineering, 15 AIPPI J. (Japan) 13-17 (1990)
(citing authorities).
52. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 29(1).
53. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 23, at 47-50, 258.
54. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 4A(I).
55. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 23, at 19-22 (documenting reliance of early Japa-
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tees' revenues are eroded by disclosure and by the practice of in-
venting around claimed discoveries, both consumers and local pro-
ducers of intermediate goods may benefit. Hence, a leading schol-
ar finds that the "rents to inventors, particularly the present value
of rents, are generally only a fraction of the ultimate value of the
invention. 56
One problem with the drive for universal standards is that dif-
ferences between developed patent systems will require compromis-
es likely to prove painful even for certain industrialized countries
that are reluctant to change their domestic laws. Current discus-
sions of patent harmonization, if brought within future negotiations
envisioned by the TRIPS Agreement,57 could thus induce the Unit-
ed States to adopt the first-to-file system in use everywhere else;
to employ a more absolute standard of novelty than its domestic
law now requires; and to publish all patent applications after eigh-
teen months whether or not the patents in question actually issue. 8
These moves could encourage domestic innovators to rely on trade
secret protection more than at present and could also strengthen the
position of foreign applicants at a time when the domestic market
has become increasingly dependent on foreign technologies. 9
Meanwhile, policymakers in developing countries are rightly
nese inventors on systematic assimilation of patent disclosures published abroad). Legis-
lative enactment of utility model laws to stimulate local adaptation of foreign technology
is still another Japanese tactic that developing countries can emulate. See infra text
accompanying notes 307-15.
56. Evenson, supra note 42, at 331 (noting that, in most cases, rents are eroded
within a few years, in part because the maximum amount accruing depends on the next
best alternative technology).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 334-39.
58. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 23, at 44-84, 257-66 (noting discrimination against
foreign patentees in 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988), which often prevents foreigners from invok-
ing first-to-invent procedure because "an applicant for a patent . . . may not establish a
date of invention by reference to knowledge or use [of the invention], or other activity
with respect thereto, in a foreign country," except as provided for by priorities under
existing international conventions); see also Harold C. Wegner, International Patent Law
Developments, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 329 (1993).
59. See, e.g., R. Carl Moy, Patent Harmonization, Protectionism, and Legislation,
74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 777, 781-93 (1992) (championing protectionist bias
of current U.S. law over free-trade bias of harmonization proposals).
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concerned about the foreign patentee's exclusive right to import
patented goods, which has been strengthened by the elimination of
local working requirements under the Draft TRIPS Agreement and
by tariff reductions also resulting from the Uruguay Round. ° En-
hanced market access for developing-country exporters must, there-
fore, be weighed against correspondingly improved prospects for
imports of patented goods from developed to developing countries.
Several factors attenuate these concerns. For example, the
TRIPS negotiators failed to agree on any international norms gov-
erning the principle of exhaustion.61  National legislation may,
therefore, continue to allow parallel imports of genuine goods, at
least to the extent that such imports remain consistent with other
provisions of the GATT. 62 Parallel imports lower prices and en-
courage foreign patentees to establish themselves locally in order
to monitor the market and adjust business strategies to changing
conditions.63
To the extent that foreign producers elect to satisfy the market
by imports alone, in order to exploit monopolistic pricing and other
advantages identified above, their exposure to rent erosion by local
entrepreneurs who remain closer to the market increases. 64 These
pressures will mount if authorities in developing countries make
use of compulsory licensing provisions, explicitly authorized by the
Draft TRIPS Agreement, to combat unreasonably priced imports
and other abuses.65 Distant production and monopoly pricing also
60. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 27(1), 28(l)(a); IPRs and FDI,
supra note 23, at 7, 13.
61. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6.
62. A footnote to the Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 28(l)(a), expressly
subordinates the exclusive right to import patented products to Article 6, which exempts
the topic of exhaustion from the purview of the TRIPS Agreement. See also Cottier,
supra note 33, at 399-400 (citing GATT Articles XXIII(l)(b), XX(d), and XXIV as possi-
ble limits on various doctrines of exhaustion).
63. See, e.g., Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Andrds Moncayo von Hase, Intellectual Proper-
ty Protection and International Trade-Exhaustion of Rights Revisited, 16 WORLD COM-
PETITION 115, 130 (1992) (stressing role of parallel imports and exports of genuine goods
in encouraging competition and price levelling); IPRs and FDI, supra- note 23, at 13.
64. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
65. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 31(b), 40; infra notes 117-35
and accompanying text.
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render substitute technology more attractive to local consumers,
which opens up additional opportunities for local entrepreneurs
who may benefit from lower labor costs as well'as from lower
costs of less advanced technologies.
In other words, stronger patent laws should give local industries
greater incentives to exploit technologies that have already entered
the public domain. Most technological innovation remains unpat-
entable by definition because it fails to take an inventive step be-
yond the prior art, and this applies to much technological know-
how associated with patented inventions or components thereof.
Because mature patent systems forbid protection of routine innova-
tion, their stringent substantive requirements indirectly encourage
competition across the board while elevating the collective techno-
logical culture to its next highest level.66
In the past, developing countries tended to overemphasize ef-
forts to reform the international patent system at the expense of
strategies to encourage domestic exploitation of unpatented technol-
ogies.67 Changing this emphasis is essential for the future competi-
tive prospects of the developing countries for at least two reasons.
First, unpatented technologies often remain eminently suitable for
local needs. Second, the Draft TRIPS Agreement has left unpatent-
ed applications of today's most advanced scientific know-how par-
ticularly vulnerable to third-party appropriation. These matters are
more fully explored below.68
Another important consequence of stronger patent laws is that
they give proprietors in industrialized countries greater incentives
to license patented inventions to entrepreneurs in developing coun-
tries. Small- and medium-sized technology exporters appear partic-
ularly responsive to the lower transaction costs that proprietary
66. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(1) (requiring novelty,
nonobviousness, i.e., an inventive step, and industrial application); see also Michael
Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property-Property Rights as Restrictions on Compe-
tition in Furtherance of Competition, 20 I.I.C. 1 (1989).
67. See, e.g., MARTINE HIANCE & YVES PLASSERAUD, BREVETS ET Sous-
DgVELOPPEMENT: LA PROTECTION DES INVENTIONS DANS LE TIERS-MONDE 95-99
(1972).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 258-71.
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regimes tend to foster.69 Increased local licensing potentiates ac-
cess to the latest technologies while increasing the pool of local
skills capable of eroding monopoly rents.70 In certain fields, nota-
bly information technologies, licensing may afford the only means
of circumventing oligopolistic prices and practices.71
Over time, developing-country licensees who exploit their natu-
ral advantages, especially low labor costs, could succeed on both
domestic and export markets where nonlicensees were unable or
unwilling to venture in the past. Conversely, when measures to
attract either licensing or direct foreign investment fail, these coun-
tries can encourage local firms to enter the market as soon as pat-
ents supporting significant imports expire.
3. New Technologies
Special problems arise from the gradual extension of patents to
new technologies, especially computer programs and biogenetic
engineering, without the emergence of clear international minimum
standards. In the United States, for example, the patenting of both
computer programs and biogenetic innovation has grown consider-
ably in recent years, whereas the European Community has moved
at a slower pace, especially as regards computer programs. 72 The
69. See, e.g., Farok J. Contractor, Licensing Versus Foreign Direct Investment in U.S.
Corporate Strategy: An Analysis of Aggregate U.S. Data, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLO-
GY TRANSFER: CONCEPTS, MEASURES, AND COMPARISONS 277-78, 300, 314 (Nathan
Rosenberg & Claudio Frischtak eds., 1985). In this context, local licensing does not
always benefit developing countries more than direct foreign investment, especially
regarding the goal of lowering consumer prices; some observers treat licensing and direct
foreign investment as strategic substitutes. See id. at 314; Mansfield, supra note 7, at 43-
45; Rozek, supra note 2, at 27-30. Much also depends on the extent to which the host
country can prevent abusive licensing practices without discouraging the transfer of
technology. See, e.g., Ullrich, supra note 7, at 136-38; see also infra text accompanying
notes 266-71, 367-71.
70. See, e.g., Leaffer, supra note 12, at 283; Rozek, supra note 2, at 27-30.
71. See, e.g., Ashoka Mody, New International Environment for Intellectual Property
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 41, 203, 230-35.
72. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 48, at 356-62; John H. Barton, Adapting the
Intellectual Property System to New Technologies, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY, supra note 3, at 256-83. See also Ronald S. Laurie, The Patentability
of Artificial Intelligence Under U.S. Law, in WIPO WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 121, 121-50 (1991).
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unsettled legal status of these technologies is reflected in the Draft
TRIPS Agreement, whose ambiguities in this regard leave much to
the discretion of domestic law.
a. Biotechnology and plant varieties
Although United States law extends patent protection to virtual-
ly all forms of biogenetic engineering, including plant and animal
varieties,73 the Draft TRIPS Agreement follows the European Patent
Convention of 1973, which recognizes the patentability of microbi-
ological processes but not macrobiological processes.74 As a result,
73. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); 1 IVER P. COOPER, BIO-
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW, ch. 6 (1993) ("Utility Patent Protection of Plant and Animal
Varieties"). In 1930, the United States enacted the Plant Patent Act of 1930 ("PPA"),
which recognized asexually propagated plants as patentable subject matter. See Plant
Patent Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 376, amended by Act of Sept 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 1190 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988)) [hereinafter PPA]. See also Liz Hanellin,
Note, Protecting Plant-Derived Drugs: Patents and Beyond, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 169, 182-83 (1991). The exclusion of varieties propagated through pollination, which
accounts for the bulk of all plants, crippled the PPA from its inception; the difficulties of
meeting its stiff prerequisites of eligibility further limited the efficacy of this statute. In
contrast, leading European countries opted for sui generis protection of plant varieties and,
in 1961, founded a Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants ("UPOV"). See
infra note 76 and accompanying text. Fearing that this trend might undermine the com-
petitiveness of U.S. agricultural products on world markets, Congress provided sui generis
protection for novel, sexually propagated plant varieties in the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970 ("PVPA"), but confined innovative asexually propagated varieties to the PPA.
See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970),
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-574, § 1, 94 Stat. 3350 (1980) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2321-3583 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter PVPA]. See also Lesser,
Sector Issues If: Seeds and Plants, in STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 5; Thomas E. Jurgensen, Of Plants, Patents, and Breeders' Rights: Some Proposals
for International Unification of Proprietary Protection of Plant Biotechnology, 12 J.
AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 291, 294-97 (1991). The need for an election between patents and
a sui generis law was consistent with the UPOV Convention as it stood, which the United
States joined in 1981. See infra note 76 and accompanying text; see also PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.01[6][b] (rev. ed. 1993). Such an election
is no longer required under the UPOV Convention as revised in 1991. See infra notes 86-
91 and accompanying text.
74. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(3)(b); Convention on the
Grant of European Patents, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270, art. 53(b)
[hereinafter EPC]; see generally GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM:
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 334-42 (1992) (noting




adherents to TRIPS must provide patent protection for micro-organ-
isms and for "non-biological and microbiological processes," but
not for higher organisms, whether plant or animal, nor for "essen-
tially biological processes for the production of plants or ani-
mals. 75 Parties that exclude plants from patent law, however, must
protect plant varieties under sui generis laws largely governed by
the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants ("UPOV Convention").76
Because microbiological advances routinely affect changes in
the higher plant and animal world, unsound legal distinctions be-
tween inventions said to be macro- or microbiological in nature
have not always been implemented with consistent or persuasive
results.77 Nor has a firm consensus emerged concerning the appli-
cation of patent-law mechanics to this field. For example, dis-
agreements exist with regard to the patentability of so-called "prod-
ucts of nature" and of living things in general; to the appropriate
criteria for determining novelty and nonobviousness; to the deposit
and enablement requirements; and to the proper scope of protec-
tion.7 8 Harmonization efforts are under way,79 however, and any
75. Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(3) (exempting mandatory protec-
tion for methods of treating humans or animals as well as "plants and animals other than
microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals," but requiring some protection of plant varieties).
76. See id.; International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
Dec. 2, 1961, as revised, Geneva, Oct. 23, 1978, 33 U.S.T. 2703 [hereinafter UPOV
Convention]. The UPOV Treaty was recently amended and opened for signature in
Geneva on March 19, 1991, and is awaiting ratification by five states, of which at least
three must have been a party to a prior version of the treaty. International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, opened for signature Geneva, Mar. 19,
1991, reprinted in 3 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 90.
77. See, e.g., R. STEPHEN CRESPi, PATENTS: A BASIC GUIDE TO PATENTING IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 75-82, 102-11, 152-54 (1988); Rainer Moufang, Protection for Plant
Breeding and Plant Varieties-A Frontier of Patent Law, 23 I.I.C. 328 (1992); E.
Gutterman, The Protection of Biotechnological Inventions within the Framework of the
European Patent Organization and, More Particularly, in France, 30 INDUS. PROP. 377,
377-78 (1991).
78. See, e.g., CRESPI, supra note 77, at 150-63; John Richards, International Aspects
of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
433 (1993); Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the
Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 24-71 (1991). See also JOSEPH
STRAUS & RAINER MOUFANG, DEPOSIT AND RELEASE OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL FOR
THE PURPOSES OF PATENT PROCEDURE: INDUSTRIAL AND TANGIBLE PROPERTY ISSUES
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realistic appraisal. of long-term prospects must allow for future
pressures to adhere to norms affecting biotechnology that subse-
quently attract a broad consensus.
On the whole, developed countries continue to enjoy unique
advantages in biotechnology that often become available to devel-
oping countries only as a consequence of stronger patent systems.
Some developing countries may find their own competitive status
enhanced by the provision of proprietary rights in this field, includ-
ing plant breeders' rights, and others may not. 0 For example,
opinions differ on the extent to which proprietary regimes would
themselves contribute to a transfer of productive capacity to suit-
able developing countries, especially as regards biotechnology-
based pharmaceutical products."1 Improved intellectual property
regimes are expected to increase the licensing of biotechnological
advances generally, and they would help to ensure that foreign
41-95, 115-26 (1990); R. Stephen Crespi, Patents and Plant Variety Rights: Is There an
Interface Problem?, 23 I.I.C. 168, 175-83 (1992); Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equiva-
lents: Weighing the Equities to Determine Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and
Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
79. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 23, at 303-31 (discussing WIPO harmonization
proposals in context of Paris Convention); Richards, supra note 78, at 472-80 (discussing
1988 Draft Directive of the European Communities on the Legal Protection of Biotechno-
logical Inventions and pending proposed amendments of the same).
80. See, e.g., Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellec-
tual Property Rights Regimes, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 3, at 89-106 (noting complexities of Brazilian situation); Stewart, supra note
42, at 310-15. Studies suggest that developing countries are fairly well-positioned to pro-
mote biotechnological innovation owing to such factors as climate and geography, which
endow them with genetically diverse raw materials on which the developed countries
increasingly depend. Other positive factors include the existence of agricultural research
institutes in many developing countries and the needs of consumers in these countries for
particular agricultural and pharmaceutical products of little current interest to large foreign
firms. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 39, at 9-12, 35; Rebecca L. Margulies, Note, Protect-
ing Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic
Resources, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 322, 348-49 (1993). A number of Latin American coun-
tries have already taken steps to promote research in biotechnology. Given low labor
costs, the relatively low capital investment required, and the ease of entering these mar-
kets, more developing countries are likely to target biogenetic research in the future, and
the enactment or strengthening of intellectual property regimes could further spur these
initiatives.




technologies made available locally by any means were up-to-
date.82 Domestic patenting would also disclose enabling technolo-
gies in local languages and promote greater scientific collaboration,
while all proprietary regimes could benefit some local innovators
and stimulate them to seek transnational enforcement of claims to
innovative plant genetics.
On the negative side of the balance, the patenting of biogenetic
advances decreases the possibilities of reverse-engineering and
could increase the costs of doing business in key sectors of some
developing economies, notably agriculture. At the limit, these
higher costs could offset trade concessions that result from the
Uruguay Round.83
In any event, the present lack of consensus at both national and
international levels affords developing countries considerable lee-
way in adjusting the level of protection for biogenetic innovation
to suit their own needs. Determining these needs in light of a
nondogmatic quest for competitive strategies to exploit each coun-
try's specific biological and scientific resources remains a difficult
task, although it is facilitated by the UPOV option under Article
27(3) of the Draft TRIPS Agreement.84 This provision enables
member countries to protect plant varieties, both artificial and natu-
ral, under sui generis laws rather than patent laws, or even to cu-
mulate protection under both regimes if so desired.8
5
As revised in 1991, the UPOV Convention contemplates a
twenty-year term of protection for new plant varieties, whether of
natural or artificial origin, on condition that each such variety
should be distinct, uniform and stable.86 Because only novelty but
82. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 80, at 347-48; Straus, supra note 39, at 33-34;
see also Ldszl6 KdJmAn & Mark Dickey, The Role of Plant Breeders' Rights in the Trans-
fer of Technology-li, in UPOV SEMINAR ON THE NATURE OF AND RATIONALE FOR THE
PROTECTION OF PLANT VARIETIES. UNDER THE UPOV CONVENTION 101, 106 (1991)
[hereinafter UPOV SEMINAR].
83. See, e.g., Lesser, supra note 73, at 59-68; Rajaram Dasgupta, Subsidies, Patents
and Market Access in Dunkel Draft' ECON. & POL. WKLY. (India), May 1, 1993, at 855-
58.
84. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
85. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(3)(b) (conforming, in this
respect, to UPOV Convention as revised in 1991, see supra note 76).
86. See UPOV Convention, supra note 76, arts. 5-9, 19, 33 U.S.T. at 2710-13, 2717;
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not nonobviousness is required, the UPOV Convention initially
provided a narrow scope of protection, which is still reflected in
the United States Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.87 Under
pressure from industry, however, the latest revision has broadened
the scope of protection that UPOV Convention signatories may
provide and given it a more patent-like character.88
For example, the breeder's exclusive rights with respect to
propagating material of a protected variety may now include not
only commercial production, sale and marketing, but also reproduc-
tion, propagation, or conditioning, as well as the export, import or
stocking of relevant material for any of these purposes.89 The re-
vised UPOV Convention extends breeders' rights to products made
directly from harvested materials in certain circumstances. It also
provides a range of equivalents that encompass derived varieties for
the first time while recognizing only a narrow exception for farm-
ers who use the products of their own harvests and a broad excep-
tion for research purposes.9° At the same time, the 1991 amend-
ments extend the field of application to cover the whole plant king-
dom, and not just species of interest to single states,91 a measure
that should prevent the developed countries from excluding tropical
and other varieties of particular interest to developing countries.
see also Andrd Heitz, History of the UPOV Convention and the Rationale for Plant
Breeders' Rights, in UPOV SEMINAR, supra note 82, at 19, 37. The minimum term of
protection for trees and vines is 25 years. See UPOV Convention, supra note 76, art.
19(2).
87. See PVPA, supra note 73, § 2541 (infringement), § 2543 (seed and crop exemp-
tion), § 2544 (research exemption).
88. See, e.g., John Harvey, The UPOV Convention-The Scope of Protection and Its
General Provisions, in UPOV SEMINAR, supra note 82, at 43-44.
89. UPOV Convention, supra note 76, art. 14(l)(a).
90. See id. arts. 14(2), (3), (5), 15, 16; Harvey, supra note 88, at 44-46. Cf. PVPA,
supra note 73, §§ 2541, 2543; cf. also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 989 F.2d 478
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (denying petition for rehearing in case that broadened farmer's exception
under PVPA, despite strong dissent by Judge Newman), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 23, 1993). In general, the PVPA is now considerably less pro-
tective than the UPOV Convention regime that emerged from the 1991 revision.
91. See UPOV Convention, supra note 76, arts. 3(1) (giving old members who adhere
to 1991 text five years to protect "all plant genera and species"), 3(2) (requiring new
members to protect 15 plant genera or species at the time of adherence to the convention
and all genera and species within 10 years thereafter); Harvey, supra note 88, at 46-47.
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Some experts believe that greater use of the UPOV Convention
framework to stimulate commercial exploitation of botanical re-
sources would give the developing countries unique competitive
opportunities. 92 In any case, besides evaluating the mix of propri-
etary rights that best suits their individual needs, developing coun-
tries interested in promoting biotechnological pursuits need to con-
serve their natural genetic endowment for future exploitation. De-
veloping countries may also decide to regulate the manner in which
foreigners obtain supplies of local germ plasm, with a view to
sharing in the proceeds of commercial exploitation. 93
Meanwhile, alert entrepreneurs in all countries will find that
much biotechnological innovation, especially processes for making
end-products, will fail to meet the nonobviousness standard of
domestic patent laws.94 Such innovation obtains protection in de-
veloped countries only as know-how in trade secret law, on a par
with much software innovation.95 The possibilities for reverse-
engineering are then enhanced by the self-reproductive properties
characteristic of both natural and genetically refined organisms.9
Moreover, entrepreneurs in one country may sometimes manu-
facture exportable end-products locally from biotechnological pro-
cesses when only these processes (but not all the corresponding
products) are patented abroad.97 Countries adversely affected by
92. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 39, at 38; Frischtak, supra note 80; Carlos M.
Correa, Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights, 14 E.I.P.R. 154, 157
(1992).
93. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 80, at 349, 351-53 (citing authorities). By treat-
ing germ plasm like other natural resources, the developing countries could eventually sell
exploration rights, or license specific materials for royalties, or even exchange such ma-
terials for advanced technologies and technical assistance. In the long term, coordinated
conservation efforts could lead to the establishment of international repositories that
would levy blanket licensing fees on seed companies and other users of plant material.
Id. 1
94. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 78, at 34-39, 42-58; Richards, supra note 78, at 452-
62.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 260-71 (discussing "The Know-How Gap in
TRIPS").
96. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 39, at 29.
97. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (allowing importation of foreign end-products made by nonpatented process
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such trade will move to close this loophole in due course. Even
so, to the extent that developed countries unilaterally broaden the
opportunities to patent biogenetic products or processes without
negotiating equivalent norms at the international level, firms in
developing countries may seek to patent innovations abroad that
would not be patentable at home.
b. Information technologies
Although copyright and trade secret laws are the most widely
used means to repress the copying of computer programs in both
developed and developing countries, the patenting of computer pro-
gram-related inventions has increased in recent years, especially in
the United States and Japan.98 Opposition to the patenting of com-
puter programs remains strong, however,99 and complicated judicial
tests so far devised to distinguish patentable applications of mathe-
matical algorithms to utilitarian objectives from unpatentable ideas,
scientific principles, and mathematical formulas have not earned a
scholarly consensus even in the United States.l°° Much uncertainty
that used patented intermediate product); Burk, supra note 78, at 66-69, 75-76; see also
Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with
the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (1992).
98. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A
BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 23-25, 51-56 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT 19921; COM-
PUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE 31-
38, 62-66 (1991) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE]; see also
Henri W. Hanneman, Patentability of Computer Programs in Europe, in THE LAW OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992: A COMPARISON WITH THE USA 69-85
(A.P. Meijboom & C. Prins eds., 1991).
99. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE, supra note 98, at 62-
66; Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algo-
rithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990);
Richard Stallman, Against Software Patents: The League for Programming Freedom, 14
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 297 (1992); Simpson L. Garfinkel, Richard Stallman &
Mitchel Kapor, Why Patents Are Bad for Software, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
Fall 1991, at 50-55. But see Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U.
PITr. L. REV. 959 (1986); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for
Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 U. NEB. L. REV. 351, 405-44 (1993).
100. The United States Patent and Trademark Office currently issues patents for
computer program-related inventions that are described either as a series of functional
steps carried out by a computer (i.e., as a process) or as a system capable of performing
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also surrounds the scope of protection likely to be afforded pro-
gram-related inventions owing to serious gaps in the patent authori-
ties' data concerning prior art and to doubts about the appropriate
level of nonobviousness in this field.'0 1
Despite the controversy it continues to spark, the patenting of
computer program-related inventions seems likely to gain ground
for a number of reasons. Copyright law cannot directly protect
program function or basic components of user interfaces, and inde-
pendent creation affords second comers a perfect defense to a
charge of copyright infringement even when courts allow some
indirect protection of these elements.10 2 As explained below, recent
certain functions (i.e., as an apparatus), but not for program code as such. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that claims to a specified
process or apparatus implemented in accordance with a mathematical algorithm will
generally satisfy the patent statute); see also OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 132.
Process claims describe functional steps at a fairly high level of abstraction, while appara-
tus claims describe the means of performing the functions that yield new machines or im-
provements of unprogrammed machines. In either case, courts treat the subject matter as
statutory only if a claimed invention consists of a so-called "nonstatutory mathematical
algorithm" as defined in complicated legal tests that aim to exclude scientific principles,
abstract ideas, and mathematical formulas or discoveries. See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d
835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
If a mathematical algorithm is deemed present, courts use these tests to determine
if it has been sufficiently applied to a utilitarian objective, as when a computer is used
as part of a process or apparatus for the transformation of a physical substance into a
different state. See, e.g., Richard H. Stem, Tales from the Algorithm War: Benson to
Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371 (1991); Ronald S. Laurie,
Patentability of Computer Programs in the United States, in THE LAW OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992: A COMPARISON WITH THE USA 87-102 (A.P. Meijboom
& C. Prins eds., 1991). However, the line between mathematical algorithms and other
types of program function is hard to draw and not really consonant with the tenets of
computer science, while European courts applying similar legal concepts might reach
different and more restrictive results on facts establishing eligibility elsewhere. See, e.g.,
OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 133, 136-37; Allen Newell, The Models Are Broken,
the Models Are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1032-33 (1986); Hanneman, supra
note 98, at 84-85.
101. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 134-46; Stem, supra note 100,
at 390-91.
102. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1992); J.H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights in Univer-
sity-Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM.-VLA
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federal appellate decisions in the United States have significantly
reduced the range of program elements likely to qualify as copy-
rightable expression, while still other decisions permit analytical
use of functional matter even when it entails the making of inter-
mediate copies.1 °3 As the software industry matures, it seems to
require greater investment in research and development and a high-
er level of innovation to penetrate crowded market segments than
in the past. These endeavors, together with still riskier applications
of artificial intelligence and other products of systems integration,
may not attract sufficient venture capital without the incentives that
patents provide. "
Against this background, the growing importance of computer
program-related patents in some developed countries has spawned
fears in developing countries that the TRIPS Agreement might
become a trojan horse if it required the latter to recognize such
patents against their own interests. Until recently, the software
industry even in developed countries has been characterized by
incremental innovation, technical dynamism, and rapid product
evolution, and these factors encourage second comers in developing
countries to acquire market shares by reimplementing known solu-
tions with local variants or by adapting and improving known tech-
niques to local conditions. 5 Patents, in contrast, could impede
both independent redevelopment of functional equivalents and re-
verse engineering, while enhancing the market power of large firms
whose cross-licensing agreements help to erect barriers to entry that
J.L. & ARTS 51, 88-93 (1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights];
see also J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist's Approach to a Techno-
logical Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 970-76 (1991) (book review) [hereinafter Reichman,
Realist's Approach].
103. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 136; Laurie, supra note 72, at
121-50.
105. See, 'e.g., Robert Schware, Software Industry Entry Strategies for Developing
Countries: A "Walking on Two Legs" Proposition, 20 WORLD DEV. 143, 148-59 (1992)
(cases of India and Brazil); K. Gopinath & M.K. Ravishankar, Intellectual Property Rights
in Computer Software: Issues at Stake for Developing Countries vis-a-vis the Dunkel
Draft, at 16 (paper presented to the Conference on Intellectual Property Rights in Com-




smaller firms find difficult to overcome. 1°6 Some observers believe
that domestic enforcement of foreign program-related patents could
so restrict competition as to condemn even developing countries
with a foothold in the world market to a chronically dependent role
as cheap suppliers of software services and little else. 107
If it is true that the patenting of computer program-related in-
ventions seems ill-suited to the developing countries' present
needs, 10 8 fears that the Draft TRIPS Agreement would require this
practice seem exaggerated, at least for the medium term. The Draft
Agreement clearly opts for copyright protection of computer pro-
grams as literary works, and it requires that ancillary relief in trade
secret law be made available, in the manner explained below. 1°9
Because the TRIPS provisions do nonetheless prohibit field-specific
exclusions of patentable subject matter, the most one can say is that
the domestic patent laws must recognize some program-related
inventions if only because their inventors could reimplement them
in hardware."O
Beyond formal recognition of marginal inventions, however,
legal barriers to patentability that are well established in the United
106. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 136.
107. See, e.g., Gopinath & Ravishankar, supra note 105, at 15.
108. Favorable prospects for some developing countries in the software sector arise
from relatively low barriers to entry, low labor costs, and a fairly adequate supply of basic
programming skills. As more developing countries digitalize their commercial and in-
dustrial sectors generally, market niches open up for local firms capable of supplying
software solutions suited to local needs, and this experience can generate export opportu-
nities over time. On the negative side, computer technology has advanced so rapidly that
developing countries not in the market may find it increasingly difficult to catch up, while
even those in the market are handicapped by the lack of infrastructure and by a shortage
of high-level design skills and tools. See generally Schware, supra note 105, at 143-44,
151-52. The high prices that distant suppliers charge for computer programs sold to
developing countries further retard efforts to close the technological gap and inspire large-
scale copying in these countries. Because copying adversely affects local suppliers trying
to maintain a foothold in the market, governments must coordinate their intellectual prop-
erty strategies with a complex array of policies needed to stimulate activity in this sector.
See id.; Gopinath & Ravishankar, supra note 105, at 12, 16-17. See also MEHEROO
JUSSAWALLA, THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A WORLD WITHOUT
FRONTIERS: A STUDY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 89-102 (1992).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 173-74, 232-47, 250-55.
110. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(1); OTA REPORT 1992,
supra note 98, at 134-35, 137.
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States and the European Community would, if broadly construed,
authorize the patent authorities in developing countries to reject the
bulk of all program-related patent applications on subject-matter
grounds alone."' The difficulties of satisfying the novelty and
nonobviousness criteria and the uncertain scope of protection that
attends issued patents in this field could further enable courts or
administrators in any jurisdiction to restrict the patenting of com-
puter program-related inventions to tolerable levels." 2 Given a lack
of consensus at the international level, in other words, developing
countries appear free to emulate the most restrictive practices rec-
ognized by developed legal systems without fear that a GATT
panel could challenge the consistency of their actions with the
letter of the TRIPS Agreement.
Perhaps the most accurate conclusion is that the Draft TRIPS
Agreement leaves both developed and developing countries free to
determine the level of protection to be afforded program-related
inventions within their respective jurisdictions but not free to im-
pose their individual decisions on other member countries. Devel-
oped countries that allow extensive patenting of computer programs
could thus exclude infringing imports from developing countries.
But the former could not prevent firms in developing countries
from ignoring these same patents at home or from exporting com-
peting products that did not violate copyright, trademark and trade
secret laws to third-country markets where such patents were not
given effect. Whether, over time, large multinational firms armed
with patented information technologies and cross-licensing arrange-
ments will continue to dominate the world market for computer
programs would depend on many factors, including the ability of
competitors from developing countries to exploit current weakness-
es in the copyright approach and to respond with lower priced
alternative technologies suited to local needs. By the same token,
developing-country entrepreneurs that achieve major breakthroughs
in software development at home need not hesitate to patent their
111. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 135, 150-51; Hanneman, supra
note 98, at 84-85.
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achievements abroad wherever program-related patents are issued.
In the long run, pressures to integrate program-related inven-
tions more fully into the international intellectual property system
could prevail unless compromise efforts to develop an appropriate
sui generis regime bear fruit. Entrepreneurs in developing coun-
tries may, therefore, consider forging alliances with trade groups in
the developed countries that oppose excessive protection of com-
puter programs.11 3 These groups should also remain open to sui
generis proposals that may one day afford a better balance between
private and public interests than either copyright or patent laws
now provide. 11
4
4. Limits of the Patent Monopoly
Although policymakers should not exaggerate the anti-competi-
tive effects of stronger patent systems in a post-TRIPS environ-
ment, different developing countries will experience different de-
grees of hardship in the short term and all may expect to experi-
ence some degree of hardship. 15 To the extent that foreign inven-
tors do not make patented technology available on reasonable terms
and unwholesome economic dependencies actually arise, single
developing countries will have to consider measures to restore the
competitive balance that are consistent with both the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the Paris Convention. 1 6 The safeguards available under
the Draft Agreement remain more ample than one might have pre-
dicted at the outset of the negotiations.
113. See, e.g., American Committee for Interoperable Systems (ACIS), ACIS State-
ment of Principles & ACIS Position on Software Copyrights, reprinted in ACIS Annual
Meeting (unpublished proceedings), Washington, D.C., June 18, 1993. •
114. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663;
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329 (1987); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms
(excerpts from a work-in-progress), in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY
325, 349-60 (Willem F. Korthals Altes et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hy-
brids].
115. See, e.g., Maskus, supra note 38, at 167-69.
116. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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a. Compulsory licenses for unreasonably priced im-
ports
Article 30 of the Draft TRIPS Agreement declares that states
should tolerate only "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights"
that Article 28 confers. Article 31 nonetheless contradicts this
principle by acknowledging that the domestic laws allow "for other
use ... without the authorisation of the right holder."'1 7 The Draft
TRIPS Agreement then spells out the bases and conditions for
governmentally imposed "other use," and there appears to be con-
siderable leeway for interpretation.
For example, Article 7 of the Draft Agreement suggests that
regulatory action might be warranted where the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights does not "contribute to
the promotion of ... innovation and to the transfer and dissemina-
tion of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
.. . and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare,
and to a balance of rights and obligations." Similarly, Article 8(1)
recognizes the need "to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to . . .
socio-economic and technological development" through measures
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement as a whole. Article 8(2)
allows appropriate measures to prevent "abuse of intellectual prop-
erty rights." ' Taken together, these articles preserve and expand
exceptions that Article 5A of the Paris Convention has long recog-
nized, and they explicitly entitle developing countries to assimilate
concerns about economic development into these exceptions. 119
Even forfeiture or revocation of the offending patent becomes
technically feasible under Article 32 of the Draft Agreement, sub-
ject to an opportunity for judicial review. 120 Forfeiture, however,
117. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 28, 30, 31.
118. See id. arts. 7, 8.
119. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 5A; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO
THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967 67-73 (1968); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 136-47, 352-56 (discussing relation of these articles to dispute-resolution
process).
120. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 32.
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remains a drastic remedy that the Paris Convention had already
subjected to numerous limitations and conditions. For example,
states could not revoke a patent merely because the patentee im-
ported the patented products instead of working the patent locally;
nor could states impose forfeiture to rectify "abuse" of the paten-
tee's exclusive rights when a compulsory license would suffice;
and a period of compulsory licensing must normally precede even
a justifiable action to revoke on grounds of abuse. 12' While forfei-
ture on other public-interest grounds remains a theoretical possibili-
ty,122 states that resort to this remedy in any but the most excep-
tional circumstances should expect to elicit protests under the
TRIPS dispute settlement framework.
123
The standard form of remedial action remains compulsory li-
censing, as it was under Article 5A of the Paris Convention, sub-
ject to important refinements and limitations that Article 31 of the
Draft TRIPS Agreement attempts to introduce. 24 In principle, both
the public-interest exception and measures to prevent abuse, respec-
tively stipulated in Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the Draft Agreement,
could justify resort to compulsory licensing. In the past, however,
the meaning of "abuse" was the source of considerable controversy.
While a few developed countries, notably the United States, limit
the concept to anti-competitive practices bordering on antitrust
violations, most countries-and a leading commentator--consider
the doctrine of abuse applicable if a patentee fails to work the
patent locally in due course or "refuses to grant licenses on reason-
able terms and thereby hampers industrial development, or does not
supply the national market with sufficient quantities of the patented
product, or demands excessive prices for such products."1 25
The Draft TRIPS Agreement merges this broader concept of
abuse with the public-interest exception for purposes of compulsory
121. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 5A(l), (3).
122. Cf. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 119, at 70 (distinguishing measures required by
the public interest from measures to prevent abuse and contending that legislation pertain-
ing to the public interest was not subject to Article 5A(3), (4) of the Paris Convention).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 342-64.
124. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31(a)-(l).
125. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 119, at 71.
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licensing under Articles 8(1) and 8(2). However, considerable ef-
fort has been made to discredit nonworking of foreign patents lo-
cally as a sufficient basis for triggering such licenses.126 The Draft
Agreement also subjects. all nonexclusive compulsory licenses
sounding in any of the bases established by Article 8 to the condi-
tions of Article 3 1. This Article normally requires the would-be
licensee to seek a negotiated license from the right holder and to
pay equitable compensation if these negotiations fail to produce a
voluntary license on reasonable terms and conditions, and it also
imposes restrictions on the exportation of products resulting from
such a license.127
Derecognition of the long-standing obligation to work patents
locally, which follows from the TRIPS proposal to vindicate the
patentee's exclusive right to import the patented products, 128 may
harm the developing countries less than one might suppose at first
glance. In the past, resort to compulsory licenses for mere non-
working had been infrequent and seldom successful, and at least
one developing-country economist casts doubt on the utility of this
device under most circumstances.1 29  Leaving aside questions of
efficiency, a requirement to produce locally despite the availability
of imports on reasonable terms could also conflict. with other
GATT rules that would apply if TRIPS became fully integrated into
a revised GATT instrument. 3' Instead, the Draft TRIPS Agree-
126. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 8(1) (relating public interest
exception to the promotion of "socio-economic and technological development," which
overlaps the broader concept of "abuse"), 31 (conditions of compulsory licenses), 27(1)
(providing that "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimina-
tion as, to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are im-
ported or locally produced"),
127. See id. art. 31(b)-(j).
128. See id. art. 28(l)(a); see also id. art. 27(1).
129. See, e.g., George A. Zaphiriou, Transnational Technology Protection, 40 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 879, 889 (1992) (citing authorities); Guillermo Cabanellas, The Consequences
of Stricter Working Requirements for Patentees Under the Paris Convention, 19 I.I.C. 158
(1988) (economic arguments against compulsory local working). See also MICHAEL
BLAKENEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 96-97 (1989).




ment allows developing countries directly to address the primary
concern underlying the old local-working requirement, namely,
monopolistic pricing. 13' To this end, Article 3 1(b) allows member
states to impose nonexclusive compulsory licenses when, despite
negotiations with the rights holders, the latter have failed to license
the patented technology "on reasonable commercial terms and con-
ditions. 132
This "fragile compromise"1 33 does limit the availability of law-
ful compulsory licensing, and it subjects such licenses to equitable
compensation and reasonable restrictions on the exportation of the
resulting products. Yet, these very limitations confirm the legiti-
macy of imposing compulsory licenses to rectify economically
unreasonable behavior, especially in regard to pricing or harsh
contractual conditions. 134 To be sure, excessive reliance on this
outcard could elicit claims of impairment and nullification, 135 and
resort to compulsory licensing would become counter-productive
over time if it unduly discouraged direct investment or other trans-
fers of technology. Nevertheless, the requirement that would-be
compulsory licensees negotiate seriously with rights holders to
obtain exclusive licenses on reasonable terms will increase the
pressure on foreign patentees to deal on reasonable terms and to
obviate the conditions that lead governments to seek compulsory
licensing in the first instance.
b. Other abuses and the public interest exception
As regards measures to prevent abuse in the narrow sense of
the term, Article 31(k) exempts compulsory licenses that correct
"anti-competitive practices" from some of the constraints discussed
above, including restrictions on exports and the duty to negotiate,
provided that a judicial or administrative body has verified that the
practice in question is truly anti-competitive. 136 In the United
131. See Subramanian, supra note 5, at 953 (showing that monopolistic pricing is the
real evil that compulsory licensing has to address).
132. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31(b).
133. Cottier, supra note 33, at 408.
134. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31(a)-(l).
135. See infra notes 339, 355 and accompanying text.
136. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 8(2), 31(k).
1993]
208 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
States, such practices border on antitrust violations, and the federal
appellate courts almost always apply a rule of reason. 137 The Euro-
pean Commission, instead, follows an elaborate set of regulations,
built around block exemptions, that limit licensors of both patents
and know-how in detailed and specified ways. 138
The developing countries remain free to pick and choose among
differing regulatory frameworks with a view to proscribing a set of
anti-competitive practices that reflects their needs and national
development strategies. 139 Whether the exemptions of Article 3 1(k)
will apply to any given compulsory license, however, could still
depend on unsound distinctions between "public interest" and
"abuse," on the one hand, and "anti-competitive practices," on the
other. 40  To complicate matters further, Article 8(2) of the Draft
Agreement expressly empowers developing countries to adopt ap-
propriate measures to deal with abusive licensing practices that
"adversely affect the international transfer of technology." Ideally,
measures to implement this provision should be negotiated with the
industrialized countries, and Article 40 commits both sides to con-
sultations concerning measures that adversely affect the transfer of
technology, including abuse of intellectual property rights.141 UNC-
TAD's Draft Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology
("UNCTAD's Draft Code") continues to provide a relevant frame-
work for these negotiations in the eyes of the developing countries. 142
137. See, e.g., JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL,
CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 2.06[4] (1992); Patent and Trademark Office
Authorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, §§ 201-202, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676 (1988)
("1988 Patent Misuse Amendments").
138. See, e.g., Valentine Korah, EEC Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 55, 76-79 (1993). See also VALENTINE KORAH, AN
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITON LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990).
139. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 40(1) (allowing action against
licensing practices that unduly restrain competition or impede the transfer and dissemi-
nation of technology in domestic markets), 40(2) (specifically authorizing measures to
regulate exclusive grantback provisions, conditions preventing challenges to validity, and
coercive package licensing); see also id. art. 8(2) authorizing measures to prevent practic-
es that "unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of tech-
nology."
140. See id. art. 31(k); supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
141. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 8(2), 40.
142. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), Draft International Code
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Meanwhile, developing countries will want to formulate their
own approaches to these problems, and their approaches are likely
to deviate from those recognized in developed countries, even if
care is taken not to discourage direct investment and the licensing
of patented technology. To this end, UNCTAD's Draft Code also
supplies guidelines for the domestic regulation of licensing agree-
ments.143 To the extent that developing countries coordinate their
policies concerning abuse and the public interest, it will better
enable them to withstand countervailing pressures from the devel-
oped countries for more limited restrictions.
Beyond traditional notions of "public interest" and "abuse," the
Draft TRIPS Agreement introduces new and more expansive con-
cepts whose outer limits have yet to be delineated at the interna-
tional level. As noted, Article 7 stresses the "promotion of techno-
logical innovation and ... the transfer and dissemination of tech-
nology ...in a manner conducive to social and economic wel-
fare." Article 8(1) expands potential public-interest exceptions to
sectors other than public health and nutrition that are "of vital im-
portance to . . .socio-economic and technological development,"
and Article 8(2) seeks to vindicate "the international transfer of
technology."'" In addition, Article 66 underscores the least-devel-
oped countries' "need for flexibility to create a viable technological
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/TOT/47 (1985) [herein-
after Draft TOT Code]; see also BLAKENEY, supra note 129, at 131-61; Wolfgang
Fikentscher & Irene Lamb, The Principles of Free and Fair Trading and of Intellectual
Property Protection in the Legal Framework of a New International Economic Order, in
I REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: GERMAN LEGAL COMMENTs 81,
91-98 (Thomas Opperman and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1987); Abdulqawi A. Yusuf,
L'Elaboration d'un code international de conduite pour le transfert de technologie: bilan
et perspectives, 1984 REVUE GINtRALE DE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [REV. GlN.
INT'L PUB.] 781.
143. See Draft TOT Code, supra note 142, ch. 4, § B; Report by Experts Addressed
to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Informal Expert Group Meeting on the Draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (Sept. 3-5, 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Experts Report on UNCTAD's Draft Code of Conduct]; see also BLAKENEY, supra
note 129, at 139-50; Yusuf, supra note 14, at 698-701 (discussing terms and conditions
of Draft TOT Code from developing countries' point of view).
144. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 7, 8(1), (2). For the relation
between these articles and the dispute-resolution procedures under the proposed TRIPS
regime, see infra text accompanying notes 352-57.
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base," and it must be read in conjunction with the other provisions
favoring this group of countries that are discussed later in this
study.145
These provisions arm the developing countries with legal bases
for maintaining some degree of domestic control over intellectual
property policies in a post-TRIPS environment.1 46 While the mean-
ing of any particular clause must emerge from evolving state prac-
tice, taken together they clearly sanction public-interest exceptions
of considerable importance to the developing countries while reject-
ing the more extreme measures these countries proposed during the
Paris Revision process.1 47 State practice within the industrialized
countries already allows for considerable leeway in matters of pub-
lic health and national security, 148 and even the United States may
fall back upon the public-interest exception to patent rights in im-
plementing a national health scheme. Eventually, specific public-
interest safeguards essential to national economic development will
have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis, in order to deal
with particular instances of technological dependency that are not
offset by enhanced market access, and these compromises are likely
to give both sides less than they want.
Finally, the administrative costs of implementing the reformed
international patent system must also enter into any calculus bear-
ing on the developing countries' rights to invoke public-interest
exceptions. To the extent that these countries become overbur-
dened by administrative costs without receiving the kind of techni-
cal cooperation promised under Article 67 of the Draft TRIPS
Agreement, 149 their case for broadened public-interest exceptions
will become compelling, indeed.
B. Trademarks and Geographical Indications
In closed economies, trademarks have long been viewed with
145. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 66; infra text accompanying
notes 333, 343-44.
146. Cf. Zaphiriou, supra note 129, at 885-86.
147. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Zaphiriou, supra note 129, at 905-14.
149. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 67 (Technical Cooperation);
see also Maskus, supra note 38, at 168-69 (stressing that developing countries may find
the administrative costs of a TRIPS regime "excessively costly" and a drain on "scarce
engineering and entrepreneurial skills").
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suspicion on the grounds that they furthered the interests of foreign
firms at the expense of local industry, led to conspicuous consump-
tion of foreign luxury goods, and generally fostered oligopolistic
barriers to entry.1 50 While there is a grain of truth in each of these
assertions, the underlying thesis tends to confuse the problem of
abuse with the economic function of marks as such.15' Stronger
international regulation of trademarks and unfair competition in a
post-TRIPS universe will require developing countries to reassess
the pro-competitive functions of trade marks in open economies
while addressing questions of abuse in a more direct fashion.1 52
The TRIPS Agreement may also require single industrialized coun-
tries, notably the United States, to undertake a more or less painful
process of harmonization.
1. Anticounterfeiting Measures and Border Controls
A formal consensus to regulate trademarks and unfair competi-
tion has always existed' under the Paris Convention, for the reason
that, as Ladas observed in 1949, "[i]nternational trade is inconceiv-
150. See, e.g., BLAKENEY, supra note 129, at 114-19.
151. See, e.g., Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical
History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 307, 345 (1979) (finding that adver-
tised marks may insulate products from price competition and that product differentiation
can yield nearly insurmountable barriers to entry).
152. Trademarks serve primarily to distinguish the goods or services of single firms
from those of other firms. By protecting the signs and symbols used to make these
distinctions, trademark law reduces the search costs to consumers, stimulates manufac-
turers to maintain consistent quality over time, and discourages conduct tending to distort
consumer preferences. See, e.g., 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 967-68 (1975) (stating
that "competition is not possible if the purchasing public cannot distinguish the competing
goods and have a chance to choose among them"); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 297-306
(1987); W.R. Cornish & Jennifer Phillips, The Economic Function of Trade Marks: An
Analysis with Special Reference to Developing Countries, 13 I.I.C. 41 (1982). However,
trademark laws should not be used to stimulate innovation or to provide incentives for
product development as such because these laws lack the limitations and safeguards with
which positive intellectual property law balances the long-term public interest against
short-term restraints on trade. See, e.g., LADAS, supra, at 967-68; J.H. Reichman, Design
Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational
Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 115-19 (1989-1990) (abridged version reprinted in
30 INDUS. PROP. 220, 257 (pts. 1 & 2) (1991)) [hereinafter Reichman, Designs and New
Technologies].
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able today without trademarks and their adequate protection."'' 5 3 In
the past, however, lax enforcement prevailed and there was no
recourse to dispute-resolution machinery.1 5 4 The Draft TRIPS pro-
visions give pre-existing norms greater specificity by strengthening
the protection of service marks, famous marks, and geographical
indications of origin, including wines. Other provisions soften the
use requirement and eliminate both compulsory licenses and local
linkage requirements. 155 Above all, the Draft Agreement subjects
the international regime of trademarks and unfair competition to
more stringent enforcement measures, including border controls
against the import of "counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright
goods."' 1
56
The primary effects of these provisions on the developing coun-
tries reside in the potential displacement of industries founded on
counterfeiting' 57 and in the high cost of legal enforcement mea-
sures. To attenuate displacement costs, developing countries need
to convert affected industries to the production of clearly marked,
substitute goods that establish their own market niche by means of
price competition with more costly foreign goods. Governments in
the developing countries should generally encourage entrepreneurs
to establish their own market identities through appropriate trade-
marks and to offer products that can be distinguished from those
already in the market. 5 8 Some developing countries may promote
153. Stephen P. Ladas, The Lanham Act and International Trade, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1949).
154. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, arts. 6-1yr; Reichman, GATT Connection,
supra note 8, at 770-75 (citing authorities).
155. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 2 (incorporating Paris Conven-
tion, supra note 27, arts. 1-12, 19), 15-21 (trademarks), 22-24 (geographical indications).
156. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 41 (general obligations as to
the enforcement of intellectual property rights), 46, 51-61,69 (special requirements related
to border control measures and counterfeit goods), 51 n.3 (defining, for purposes of border
control measures, "counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods"). See also Cottier,
supra note 33, at 403-04.
157. See, e.g., Roland Knaak, National and International Efforts Against Trademark
Counterfeiting-A Progress Report, 19 I.I.C. 581 (1988); Yves Plasseraud, Considerations
on Counterfeiting, 29 INDus. PROP. 118 (1990). For the status of "counterfeit" goods in
international law prior to the TRIPS exercise, see Reichman, GATT Connection, supra
note 8, at 769-96.
158. See, e.g., Bojan Pretnar, Industrial Property and Related Trade Policy in Less-
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geographical appellations of their own, with a view to enhancing
market identity in the future.
The Draft Agreement commits both developed and developing
countries to border-control measures to repress imports of coun-
terfeit goods. 59 The imposition of border controls represents one
of the most legitimate and promising results of the TRIPS exer-
cise,' 6' provided that states implement these measures in a genuine-
ly nondiscriminatory fashion and do not erect disguised barriers to
trade.' 61 Such measures will succeed only so long as the participat-
ing states enforce them vigilantly. To this end, both developed and
developing countries will have to curb powerful vested interests,
while the developing countries will require the technical coopera-
tion and aid that the Draft TRIPS Agreement provides for purposes
of defraying administrative and enforcement burdens. 62 If, instead,
the enforcement machinery in any given country breaks down, it
will undermine the overall effectiveness of the transnational system
envisioned by the Draft Agreement.
The Draft Agreement further envisions future negotiations lead-
ing to higher standards of protection for indications of geographical
origin. 63 These negotiations could boomerang against the United
States, whose practices in this regard fall below the standards pre-
Developed Countries: Economic Appraisal of Legal Concepts, 21 I.I.C. 782, 790-96
(1990). Such products can eventually compete on export markets under indigenous brand
names so long as efforts are made to maintain reasonable price-quality correlations. Ex-
isting Generalized System of Preferences privileges as well as enhanced market oppor-
tunities after the Uruguay Round could make such conversion more attractive.
159. See supra note 156.
160. See, e.g., Hartridge & Subramanian, supra note 9, at 907.
161. See, e.g., Robert W. Kastenmeier & David W. Beier, International Trade and
Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 297-
98 (1989) (noting need for U.S. to eliminate discriminatory effects of section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note
8, at 829-39 (discussing GATIT's Article XX(d), which forbids the use of intellectual
property norms as disguised barriers to trade), 887-89 (discussing current pressures on
Article XX(d)).
162. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 67; see also Reichman, GATT
Connection, supra note 8, at 857-61.
163. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(1), (2).
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vailing among developed countries."6 Sooner or later the United
States will have to overcome the resistance of local constituencies
and upgrade its laws in this respect. While a trade-based format
permits United States negotiators to demand trade concessions in
other areas to offset the costs of this adjustment, it also evidences
the extent to which this country has become embroiled in a contin-
uing exercise from which it cannot readily pull back. 165
2. Licensing and Unfair Competition
Strengthened trademark regimes should encourage both direct
investment in developing countries and licensing by foreign pro-
ducers who seek to monitor quality and to maintain brand names
and goodwill in the international market generally. 66  On the
whole, more technology will be licensed to domestic firms when
the licensor can both lower transaction costs by recourse to stan-
dard intellectual property norms and maintain quality controls
through trademark license agreements. Local production under
license then reduces the need for imports and helps to build an
industrial infrastructure. 67
Governments in developing countries need to formulate policies
and incentives that encourage foreign firms to allow licensees to
adapt more of the licensed products for both domestic and export
needs under local trademarks. 68 The success of Japanese industry
in importing foreign technology while developing indigenous marks
constitutes an example for other countries to emulate. Countries at
lesser stages of development may have less bargaining power when
formulating appropriate regulations, however, and may remain
more dependent on the introduction of foreign marks.
Although trademarks encourage the production of quality goods,
control over quality easily leads to control over price and other
164. See, e.g., Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 161, at 297.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 334-41, 368-70.
166. See, e.g., IPRs and FDI, supra note 23, at 29.
167. See, e.g., Rozek, supra note 2, at 27-31; M. Gabay, The Role of Trademarks in
Consumer Protection and Development in Developing Countries, 20 INDUS. PROP. 102,
111-12 (1981).
168. Cf. Pretnar, supra note 158.
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anticompetitive consequences.16 9 Accordingly, developing countries
may respond to strengthened trademark regimes in a post-TRIPS
universe by replacing obsolete and restrictive trademark laws with
up-to-date regulations dealing directly with the abusive licensing
practices that flow from market power. While Article 21 of the
Draft TRIPS Agreement expressly authorizes parties to "determine
conditions on the licensing and assignment of trademarks," the
need for adequate licensing regulations affects all subject-matter
areas covered by the TRIPS Agreement, including patents, know-
how and copyrights.170
Certain ancillary issues must also be kept in mind. For exam-
ple, the TRIPS negotiations did not resolve the problem of parallel
imports, nor did they perfect the protection of geographical indica-
tions of origin. These lacunae preserve some pre-existing export
opportunities pending future negotiations or panel decisions that
could limit past practices. 17' At the same time, the decision to
incorporate Article 1 0"b' of the Paris Convention into the Draft
TRIPS Agreement by reference means that developing countries
would have to align domestic unfair competition laws sounding in
the deception or confusion rationales with existing international
minimum standards. Failure to enforce these laws will become
actionable under the dispute-resolving mechanisms of the TRIPS
Agreement.172
169. See, e.g., Harry L. Shniderman, Trademark Licensing-A. Saga of Fantasy and
Fact, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 248, 267-68 (1949); McClure, supra note 151, at 346-
48 (noting reluctance of U.S. courts to restrain the. use of trademarks in preserving mo-
nopolistic or oligopolistic market power).
170. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 21; cf. id., art. 8(2) (permitting
appropriate measures to restrain abuses or practices that "adversely affect the international
transfer of technology"); see also BLAKENEY, supra note 129, at 139-58. To the extent
that developing countries formulate appropriate licensing norms in concert, they will find
it easier to resist countervailing pressures of either a unilateral or multilateral nature. See
infra text accompanying notes 367-71.
171. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 6 (declining to address issue
of exhaustion), 24(l)(committing member states "to enter into negotiations aimed at
increasing the protection of individual geographical indications" under Article 23). See
also Knaak, supra note 157, at 587-88; Cottier, supra note 33, at 399-400 (raising GAIT
nullification and impairment issues in regard to the problem of exhaustion).
172. See, e.g., Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2(1) (incorporating Paris
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C. Copyrights
1. Traditional Literary/Artistic Works and Neighboring
Rights
a. Normative structure
The Draft TRIPS Agreement mandates compliance with interna-
tional minimum standards embodied in the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as revised in 1971
("Berne Convention"). 73 While an exception is made for moral
rights under Article 6bis of that Convention, the Draft Agreement
treats both computer programs and compilations of data as copy-
rightable literary works, the consequences of which are discussed
below. 174 It also requires parties to provide rental rights to holders
of copyrighted computer programs and, to a lesser extent, of cine-
matographic works as well as to holders of either copyrights or
neighboring rights in sound recordings. 75
In a new departure, Article 14 of the Draft Agreement mandates
recognition of those neighboring rights that had been experimental-
ly protected at the international level only since the signing of the
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Produc-
ers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations ("Rome Con-
vention") in 1961.176 As a result, performers of sound recordings
Convention, supra note 27, art. 10 s" by reference); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 119, at
144; Cottier, supra note 33, at 404.
173. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Con-
vention]; Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 9(1) (obliging member states to
comply with Beme Convention, Articles 1-21 plus Appendix, but excluding moral rights
under Article 6b ); Paul Edward Geller, Can the GATT Incorporate Berne Whole?, 12
E.I.P.R. 423 (1990). The United States became a party to the Berne Convention on
March 1, 1989. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1989).
174. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 10; see infra text accompanying
notes 210-48.
175. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 10, 11, 14(4). Technically,
Article 11 exempts cinematographic works from a de lege rental right if there has not
been "widespread copying.., which is materially impairing the exclusive right of repro-
duction." This provision, which accommodates U.S. practice, introduces a trade law
concept like that of "material injury" into intellectual property law for the first time. See,
e.g., Cottier, supra note 33, at 402.
176. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
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would enjoy at least the legal possibility of preventing unauthorized
fixation, reproduction, and broadcasting of their performances, but
not necessarily an exclusive right to these performances; producers
of sound recordings would enjoy exclusive reproduction rights, but
not necessarily public performance rights, in their sound recordings;
and broadcasting organizations would enjoy exclusive rights of
fixation, reproduction and rebroadcasting of their programs to the
public.177
Article 14(5) extends the minimum term of protection for per-
formers and producers of phonograms from 20 to 50 years and
confirms a 20-year term for broadcasts.17 8 However, Article 14(6)
softens the impact of the neighboring rights provisions by incorpo-
rating "conditions, limitations, exceptions and reservations" already
permitted by the Rome Convention. Among other things, this
clause enables parties to deny a public performance right to pro-
ducers and performers of sound recordings; to impose reciprocity,
rather than national treatment, on foreign phonograms producers;
and to permit both private use and use for the purposes of teaching
or scientific research without remuneration.
179
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, Rome, 496 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter Rome Convention]; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION
(WIPO), GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION AND TO THE PHONOGRAMS CONVENTION 7-
13 (1981), [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION]. The U.S. does not adhere
to the Rome Convention.
Neighboring fights, or "rights neighboring on copyright," generally cover "the rights
of performing artists in their performances, the rights of producers of phonograms [i.e.,
sound recordings] in their phonograms, and the rights of broadcasting organisations in
their radio and television programs." World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
Basic Notions of Neighboring Rights-International Conventions in the Field of Neighbor-
ing Rights, at 2, WIPO Doc. WIPO/CR/GE/92/3 (Aug. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Basic No-
tions of Neighboring Rights].
177. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 14; Cf. GUIDE TO THE ROME
CONVENTION, supra note 176, at 34-38, 43, 46-54. States may, and often do provide
similar or greater levels of protection under copyright laws, on condition that they do not
in this way adversely affect the level of copyright protection for literary and artistic works
that the Berne Convention otherwise requires. See Basic Notions of Neighboring Rights,
supra note 176, at 8-9.
178. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 14(5).
179. See id. art. 14(6); Rome Convention, supra note 176, arts. 12, 15(a), (d), 16;
GUIDE TO THE ROME CONVENTION, supra note 176, at 57-58; see also Basic Notions of
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Although the United States does not adhere to the Rome Con-
vention and does not recognize the relevant bundle of neighboring
rights as such, its copyright law technically overfulfills the mini-
mum requirements of Article 14.180 However, the rights of United
States producers and performers of phonograms to participate fully
in revenues generated under neighboring rights regimes abroad has
not been established, and efforts to bridge the gap between the
United States and the European Community in this regard have so
far not borne fruit. 81
b. Compulsory licenses for educational and scientific
works
Although the developed countries have pressed for the inclusion
of copyrights and neighboring rights within a TRIPS Agreement,
literary and artistic creativity is universally distributed, and situa-
tional disadvantages seldom preclude authors in developing coun-
tries from entering domestic or foreign markets. Many developing
countries participate fully in these markets. 182 Literary and artistic
property rights thus become vehicles for the development of auton-
omous cultural industries everywhere and for the preservation and
enhancement of the developing countries' own cultural heritage.
Even mandatory recognition of neighboring rights opens certain
opportunities for countries whose music, dance and folklore are
important components of the national heritage, as attested by the
Neighboring Rights, supra note 176, at 12.
180. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(6) (motion pictures and other audiovisual works),
102(a)(7) (sound recordings), 106, (exclusive rights), 107 (fair use), 110 (general immuni-
ties and exemptions), 111 (cable television), 114 (limiting exclusive rights in sound
recordings), 118-119, 302 (1988); see also supra note 177. Whether U.S. protection of
performers' rights satisfies the spirit of these provisions poses a closer question.
181. See, e.g., Oman, supra note 23, at 147.
182. See, e.g., Malcolm D. Rowat, An Assessment of Intellectual Property Protection
in LDCs from Both a Legal and Economic Perspective-Case Studies of Mexico, Chile
and Argentina, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 401, 419-20, 422, 428 (1993) (noting
relatively high-level of copyright protection in Latin American countries, in keeping with
long established literary traditions); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Sector Issues 1, in
STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 47, 55 (noting success of
India's film industry and of Brazilian TV network in developing country markets); see
also Thomas N. O'Neill, III, Thai Copyright Law, Economic Development and Interna-
tional Trade, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1131, 1152-58, 1161-62 (1992).
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fact that over half of the parties to the Rome Convention are devel-
oping countries.18
3
The balance of trade in cultural goods nonetheless favors ex-
ports from industrialized countries, and this imbalance could in-
crease under a Draft TRIPS Agreement that seeks to eliminate free-
riding in the audio, visual, publishing, and broadcasting sectors.18 4
This conclusion follows in part from prior multilateral negotiations
to revise the Berne Convention, which established the principle that
developing countries could not qualify for differential and more
favorable treatment with respect to nonessential works, especially
works of mass entertainment that weigh heavily in the balance of
trade."15 Conversely, the revised Berne Convention did enable
nationals of developing countries to secure nonexclusive compulso-
ry licenses on favorable terms that grant the rights to translate or
otherwise reproduce literary, scientific, and artistic works for teach-
ing, scholarship, or research purposes. 186 The Rome Convention as
183. See DENIS DE FREITAS, THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 53-55 (1983); Basic Notions of Neighboring Rights, supra
note 176, at 14. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"),
neighboring rights are of particular interest to countries endowed with oral traditions and
culture, in the representation of which "authors" are usually performers as well. Expres-
sions of folklore that often fail to qualify for copyright protection can thus indirectly
obtain protection from rights in performances, fixations, and broadcasts. Similarly, the
protection of phonogram producers allows developing countries to establish their own
sound-recording industries, which "guarantee[s] ... the dissemination of national culture,
both within the country and throughout the world," and also fosters export opportunities.
Id. at 14. In WIPO's view, legal safeguards for the interests of performers and producers
of phonograms ensure that local productions will "enjoy greater development.., and will
suffer less from the competition of unprotected performances of foreign works." Id. at
15. In the same vein, broadcasting organizations in developing countries can benefit from
protecting costly programs against unauthorized reproduction, and rebroadcasts of major
cultural and sports programs abroad are potential sources of foreign exchange.
184. See, e.g., Rowat, supra note 182, at 419 (showing losses to U.S. exporters to
Mexico alone in the range of $75 million for pirated sound recordings, $88 million for
pirated motion pictures, and $100 million for computer programs).
185. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 822-27 ("Preferential
Treatment under the Copyright Conventions").
186. See Berne Convention, supra note 173, art. 21, app. arts. 1-6 (allowing nonex-
clusive compulsory licenses for certain educational and scientific purposes, but forbidding
exports of works published under these regimes); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVEN-
TION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 632-64
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incorporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement expressly
allows the domestic laws of member states to exempt both private
use and uses for the purpose of teaching or scientific research.187
Whether the social costs of a TRIPS Agreement will induce the
developing countries to make greater use of these concessions than
in the past cannot be foretold. In any event, the high cost of im-
ported computer programs, together with a pressing need for devel-
oping countries to computerize their industrial activities and to
inculcate programming skills and knowledge, make it logical for
these countries to demand the inclusion of copyrighted software in
the list of works subject to compulsory licenses for educational
purposes. 188
c. Scope of protection and the public interest
Despite the elaborate web of norms already governing interna-
tional copyright relations,18 9 the scope of copyright protection varies
from country to country, with little in the way of authoritative legal
limitations recognized by international law. For example, there is
no international norm governing nonliteral copying, as distinct from
literal violations of the exclusive reproduction rights, and state
practice varies widely in this regard.' 90 As explained below, bor-
(1987).
187. See Rome Convention, supra note 176, art. 15; Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 17, art. 14(6).
188. See, e.g., Gopinath & Ravishankar, supra note 105, at 17; O'Neill, supra note
182, at 1159 (stating that most Thais cannot afford the prices of legitimate software
products); see also infra text accompanying notes 245-47. To the extent that closer coop-
eration between developing countries facilitated the negotiation of concessionary educa-
tional licenses covering multiple markets for both books and computer programs, it would
also press distant suppliers to establish publishing ventures in local markets. This, in turn,
could increase employment and further reduce the costs of textbooks and other education-
al materials, including software.
189. See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 186, at 206; Reichman, GATT Connection,
supra note 8, at 846-48.
190. In part, these variations derive from differences of protective philosophy associ-
ated with the utilitarian or incentive rationale of the so-called "copyright" countries and
with the authorship rationale of the droit d'auteur countries. See, e.g., Paul Edward
Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [R.I.D.A.] (forthcoming 1994). See also Wendy J. Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
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derline subject matter categories, notably functional and factual
works, receive "thin" or disfavored treatment even in the United
States, a tendency that strengthens the developing countries' ability
to compete in the market for electronic information tools. 191
Because copyright law regulates the specialized market for
literary and artistic works, rather than the general products market,
its soft protective modalities differ from the harder monopolies of
patents and industrial property rights generally.192 Moreover, cultur-
al policy often overrides considerations of economic efficiency
based strictly on utilitarian incentives. For example, basic copy-
right norms recognized by all developed legal systems protect only
an author's original expression, not his ideas, 193 and independent
creation constitutes a perfect defense to any charge of copying.
194
These limitations promote competition by a built-in process of
"reverse engineering" that permits third parties freely to use the
facts and ideas underlying clusters of related expression. 95 By dint
of their low standards of creativity and originality, moreover, copy-
right systems allow the market to determine value. Anyone whose
literary and artistic creations capture the public's fancy is entitled
to a sweepstakes reward that offsets losses from previous essays
and attenuates the risk aversion of publishers who invest in dissem-
ination.
Besides exploiting these loopholes, the developing countries
may broadly apply certain public-interest exceptions that can help
to reduce the overall costs of a TRIPS agreement. For example,
the fair use exception disculpates certain unauthorized but socially
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
191. See, e.g., Reichman, Realist's Approach, supra note 102, at 966-76; Jerome H.
Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property
Law, 24 I.I.C. 446, 447-51, 456-61 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, Electronic Information
Tools]; infra text accompanying notes 209-48.
192. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 114, at 329-32.
193. Accord Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 9(2) (expressly establishing
idea-expression dichotomy).
194. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 7.2.2 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
195. See, e.g., Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 191, at 455-56,
461-62.
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beneficial uses either because transaction costs might otherwise
stand in the way of negotiated licenses or because the resulting
public benefit is thought to outweigh the loss of private gain.19 6
The fair use exception also perfects a broader legislative denial in
most countries of any exclusive right to use the copyrighted work,
over and above those specific uses protected under the Berne Con-
vention. 7 The first sale doctrine (that is, the principle of exhaus-
tion), which limits the exclusive distribution right, thus authorizes
those who purchase copies of protected works to use and dispose
of these copies as they wish, although this doctrine has recently
been eroded with respect to rental rights in cinematographic works,
phonograms, and computer programs.198
In addition, both domestic and international law recognize nu-
merous exemptions and immunities for educational and social pur-
poses, as well as the imposition of compulsory licenses for record-
ed musical works and broadcasts. 199 Still other limitations arise
from the state's general exercise of its police powers and from
abuses of the statutory monopoly, whether or not rising to the level
of antitrust violations.2 °° In some countries, even the protection of
moral rights assumes a public-interest character by enabling state
authorities to preserve the integrity of cultural goods beyond the
lifetimes of their creators or, in the case of folklore, in the absence
196. See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 186, at 479-89; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 194,
§ 10.1. See also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPY-
RIGHT-A LAW OF 'USERS' RIGHTS 191-222 (1991); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Mar-
ket Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Prede-
cessors, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 253 (1983).
197. See, e.g., FRDtRIC POLLAUD-DULIAN, LE DROIT DE DESTINATION: LE SORT
DES EXEMPLAIRES IN DROIT D'AUTEUR 279-399 (1989); Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for
Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 588-89
(1985).
198. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988), amended by Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134, 5135 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 109(b), (e) (Supp. IV 1992)); supra note 175 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-120 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Berne Convention,
supra note 173, art. 2b"
' (2), 9(2), 10, 10 11, llbi( 2), 13; RICKETSON, supra note 186, at 532-
42.
200. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 173, art. 17; RICKETSON, supra note
186, at 542-48; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 194, § 9.6.
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of specifically identifiable authors. °"
It is in this realm of public-interest exceptions that the develop-
ing countries may coordinate their policies with a view to enhanc-
ing their own competitive prospects both in specific dispute-resolv-
ing exercises and in bilateral or multilateral negotiating forums. 2°
For example, the developing countries may formulate common
principles governing reprography for personal use, especially re-
search or study, as well as for general educational purposes, in
order to limit the future demands of foreign collection societies
already operating in this sphere.20 3 Besides adopting immunities
and exemptions for face-to-face teaching activities, educational
broadcasts, religious functions, and other eleemosynary pursuits
favored by developed copyright systems, the developing countries
are likely to recognize a public-interest exception for overriding
economic development needs. 2°4 Authorities in these countries will
also monitor the evolution of neighboring rights agreements affect-
ing broadcasts and both producers and performers of phonograms,
with a view to adapting these rights to their own needs and to prof-
iting from the disunity that still characterizes this area at the inter-
national level. 2 5
201. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 173, arts. 6b"(2) llbI'(2 ), 13, 17;
RICKETSON, supra note 186, at 313-15, 542-48; DE FREITAS, supra note 183, at 13.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 334-41, 368-71.
203. Cf. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); see also Paul Edward Geller, Reprography and Other Processes of Mass Use, 38
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 21 (1990); Robert D. Hadl, The Crisis in International Copyright,
16 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427, 431-34 (1992) (criticizing European Commission's
Draft Directive on private copying).
204. Compare Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 13 (limitations and
exceptions not to conflict with normal exploitation and not to unreasonably prejudice
rights holders' interests) with id. art. 7 (stressing mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge, "social and economic welfare and.., a balance of rights and
obligations") and id. art. 8(1) (allowing public interest exceptions "in sectors of vital
importance to ... socio-economic and technological development." See also infra text
accompanying notes 343-62 (dispute-resolution process).
205. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 4(b), (c), 14; Council Directive
of 19 November 1992 on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related
to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 92/100/EEC, O.J. L 346/61 (1992); see
also Simon, supra note 23, at 278 (noting NAFTA provision of national treatment for
phonograms and private copying levies, a condition not guaranteed by TRIPS' incorpora-
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Meanwhile, the process of harmonization that the TRIPS exer-
cise has set in motion will, sooner or later, affect developed coun-
tries whose domestic copyright laws lag behind norms widely rec-
ognized by mature copyright systems. The United States, in partic-
ular, will face continuing pressure to elevate domestic standards
pertaining to moral rights2°6 and to conform to the retroactivity
clause of the Berne Convention.20 7 The federal judiciary's rather
free-wheeling approach to fair use may also come under closer
scrutiny at the international level, and record companies will be
pressed to enhance the rights of performers in their sound record-
ings.208 In this as in other respects, the drive for universal stan-
dards of copyright protection operates as a two-edged sword whose
overall costs must be taken into account.
2. Borderline Subject Matter: Electronic Information
Tools
While the extension of copyright protection to borderline tech-
nologies, particularly electronic information tools such as computer
programs, computerized databases and CD-ROMs, poses serious
problems for all intellectual property systems, the risk of overpro-
tection could disproportionately harm the developing countries who
are struggling to overcome technological lag.20 9 In this connection,
Article 10 of the Draft TRIPS Agreement requires all participating
countries to protect computer programs in any form "as literary
works under the Berne Convention (1971)" and also to protect
compilations of data that "constitute intellectual creations. 210
These premature attempts to establish high international stan-
dards for databases and computer programs could distort interna-
tion of Rome Convention, Article 16, which allows reciprocity); Oman, supra note 23.
206. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 173, art. 6 b,; Cottier, supra note 33, at
401-02; Oman, supra note 23, at 156.
207. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 173, art. 18; Katherine S. Deters,
Retroactivity and Reliance Rights Under Article 18 of the Berne Copyright Convention,
24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971 (1991).
208. See, e.g., Cottier, supra note 33, at 402; Oman, supra note 23, at 155.
209. See, e.g., Primo Braga, supra note 182, at 51-54 (citing authorities); Stewart,
supra note 42, at 313-15.
210. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 10(1), (2).
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tional trade, especially if they lead to levels of protection that are
inefficient even for developed countries.21 1  At present, however,
countervailing judicial trends under way in the United States indi-
cate that the full copyright approach institutionalized by the Draft
TRIPS Agreement may not give the industrialized countries the
level of protection they desire; nor need it unduly impede efforts
of the developing countries to compete in these areas.21 2 This con-
clusion is reinforced by the failure of the TRIPS Agreement direct-
ly to address the protection of applied scientific know-how, where
the true commercial value of electronic information tools usually
resides. These themes are more fully investigated below.21 3
a. Factual works, including databases
Although factual works fall within the broad categories of liter-
ary works covered by international copyright law, their degree of
eligibility and proper scope of protection has become highly con-
troversial. To begin with, compilations of data often lack the
stamp of personal intellectual creation that the droit d'auteur coun-
tries require, while the United States Supreme Court has recently
found that routine compilations of data, such as a telephone direc-
tory, may fail to meet the "original work of authorship" standard
under the United States Copyright Act of 1976.214 The Supreme
Court denied copyright protection to all literary productions based
merely on "sweat of the brow" labor and effort because only "cre-
ative authorship" satisfies the Constitutional enabling clause gov-
erning copyrights and patents.215
211. See, e.g., Mody, supra note 71, at 275; Reichman, GATT Connection, supra
note 8, at 875-78.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 232-43.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 256-65.
214. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); see
also P. Bemt Hugenholtz, Convergence and Divergence in Intellectual Property Law: The
Case of the Software Directive in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 114, at 319, 320-21 ("The Paradox of Originality").
215. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 143, 145-
59; see also L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719,
728-31, 792-813 (1989). But see Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1888-93 (1990).
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Even when compilations of data meet the eligibility require-
ments of domestic copyright laws, the scope of protection in most
countries rarely prevents more than slavish imitation of either the
compilation as a whole or of a substantial extract based on the
same selection and arrangement. This means, as the aforemen-
tioned United States Supreme Court's decision confirms, that the
compiler's copyright cannot prevent third parties from freely ex-
ploiting the disparate facts contained in the compilation, although
unfair competition law may provide occasional relief.216 To address
this problem, the Commission of the European Communities has
proposed a sui generis law that would provide noncopyrightable
databases with short-term protection against free use of the data
they contain, subject to compulsory licenses to maintain a degree
of competition.217
These provisory solutions hardly suffice to deal with the more
complex problems that digitalization will soon usher in because
digitalization changes how authors work, the kinds of works they
create, and the way users exploit the end results.1 8 One immediate
challenge for both industrialized and developing countries is how
to obtain digitalized information needed for economic development
at prices users can afford when electronic information publishers
216. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 885, 894-99 (1992); Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 191, at
448-51 (citing foreign authorities); see generally Symposium, Copyright Protection for
Computer Databases, CD-ROMS and Factual Compilations (pts. 1 & 2), 17 U DAYTON
L. REV. 323, 731 (1992).
217. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(92)94 final-SYN 393.
218. For example, the line between data and the software designed to manipulate it
breaks down in applications of artificial intelligence and in object-oriented programming.
Hypertext publishing then makes it possible to link related pieces of information in a non-
sequential manner, but it poses hard questions about the legal relations between the
"authors" of hypertext and the authors of works used in building the system. Mixed-
media productions embodied on CD-ROMs break down the subject-mater categories of
classical copyright law, which sometimes creates insuperable barriers to licensing. Digita-
lized libraries open new horizons for scholarship, but they may require "knowbot" tools
to search out different sources and to track the relevant rights and obligations. See gener-
ally OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 161-77; Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and




condition access to data on the payment of high subscription fees,
user charges, search-time charges, downloading fees and document
retrieval fees. 219 Because subscribers entering any on-line database
must log in and out, the proprietors' physical control over the data
may enable them to charge for each and every use of electronically
processed information, even though the copyright law itself grants
no exclusive right to control either end use in general or the use of
disparate facts in particular. Even when dissemination occurs in
hard copy form, such as a CD-ROM, digital technology facilitates
the control of end use by enabling intermediate providers, such as
libraries, to monitor actual usage and by permitting originators who
constantly update the data to charge, directly or indirectly, for all
uses. Heightened powers of control thus enable publishers to mon-
itor and charge even for uses analogous to those customarily re-
garded as privileged, such as the making of copies for personal use
or for research purposes.22°
Besides charging high access fees, publishers of electronic data-
bases have bolstered their market power by imposing harsh condi-
tions in two-way contractual agreements that fall outside of the
domestic copyright laws. For example, publishers that supply on-
line information to a network of licensed subscribers may impose
a "one at a time" use requirement that forbids networking by multi-
ple users. If networking is allowed, publishers may require the
user to obtain a much more expensive license.22'
To the extent that electronic information publishers depend on
public and private libraries to broaden the diffusion of their prod-
ucts, whether on line or in CD-ROMs, the publishers' natural mo-
nopoly enables them contractually to require librarians to waive
privileges that copyright law otherwise affords and to limit users'
219. Cf. OTA REPORT 1992, supra" note 98, at 176-77.
220. Cf. PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 196, at 193-96, 218-22.
221. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 166-67; Reichman, Electronic
Information Tools, supra note 191, at 461-67 ("The Public Interest at Odds with the Two-
Party Deal"). By supplying on-line information from computerized and constantly updat-
ed databases kept on their own premises, publishers avoid the kind of dissemination in
hard copies that subjects them to the first sale doctrine (or principle of exhaustion) under
copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
19931
228 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
access to copyrighted matter beyond what the fair use doctrine
would require. For example, a library's right to make back-up or
archival copies, which the copyright law grants to owners of com-
puter programs in most developed countries,222 does not clearly
extend to digital data, and the publisher's licensing agreement may
attempt to abrogate it in any event. Similarly, database publishers
in the United States have tried to limit the resource-sharing practic-
es of libraries, which otherwise rest on specific exemptions under
domestic copyright law, because the publishers view this practice
as one that reduces the market for information. The ability of
libraries to enhance the data they receive contractually in order to
augment users' efficiencies also remains unclear in the absence of
contractual authorization.223
Computerization thus increasingly enables the electronic infor-
mation publisher to serve as his or her own collection society,
subject to no membership controls and no external regulation.
Even though subscribers to electronic databases are typically orga-
nizations in industrialized countries, such as corporations, libraries,
and universities, the compilers' market power threatens to make the
task of updating scientific and technological undertakings too costly
even for these organizations. The privatization of information with-
out offsetting compensatory mechanisms could thus further retard
technological progress in developing countries.224
Policymakers in all countries must, therefore, begin to formu-
late overriding public-interest limitations on both the legal protec-
tion of computerized databases and abusive two-party licensing
deals irrespective of the technical norms and limits of copyright
law. The lack of effective, as opposed to formal, international
standards of protection in this area leaves developing countries
considerable leeway in which to foster certain socially beneficial
uses of commercialized information at acceptable costs without
222. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 117 (1988).
223. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 176-79.
224. Cf. JUSSAWALLA, supra note 108, at 89-102; Mody, supra note 71, at 204-05,
213-14. See also Cees J. Hamelink, Communications in the Third World: The Challenge
of Civil Society, in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 114,
at 153-59 (noting problem of "information famine" in developing countries).
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unduly discouraging local compilers of tailor-made information
products that may be sold to both domestic and foreign users.
While toleration of wholesale duplication of data by free-riding
local publishers could violate the Draft TRIPS Agreement, the
developing countries may have to take the lead in regulating pro-
viders of databases and other electronic information tools in order
to promote the "balance of rights and obligations" required by
Article 7 of that same Agreement.225
b. Functional works, including computer programs
In assessing the potential impact of a TRIPS Agreement on the
legal protection of computer programs, policymakers must once
again bear the limits of the copyright paradigm firmly in mind. As
previously observed, copyright law prohibits only the copying of
an author's creative expression, but not the use of underlying ideas
or of other functionally determined matter, and independent cre-
ation constitutes a perfect defense.226
In applying these principles to actual cases, few problems arise
so long as a taking of surface expression is at issue, normally of
program code, or so long as wholesale duplication has occurred.227
In this respect, copyright protection against slavish imitation in
English-speaking countries performs a function often left to unfair
competition laws in some European Community countries. Beyond
slavish duplication, however, courts and commentators in the devel-
oped countries disagree on how to distinguish the protectable ex-
pression of a computer program from its unprotectable ideas, and
no consensus has emerged concerning the proper scope of protec-
tion in cases of nonliteral copying
228
In the past, functional works-such as rule books, instruction
manuals and printed forms-obtained only "thin" protection against
225. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 7; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 352-56.
226. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
227. See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 194, § 8.5.1.2 (citing authorities).
228. See generally OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 138-43 (citing authorities);
see also Pamela Samuelson, A Case Study on Computer Programs, in GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 3, at 284-318.
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slavish imitation under domestic copyright laws owing to their
chronically low level of personal expression and to the pressure
they exert on the line of demarcation with patent law.229 The pro-
tection of computer programs, which entered codified copyright law
for the first time in 1980,230 should logically have conformed to
these precedents. In reality, some early decisions indirectly pro-
tected ideas, processes, systems and other functional matter by
narrowing the idea-expression exclusion and by broadly extending
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.23' More recently,
however, the United States federal appellate courts have revolted
against these precedents and have begun to limit the scope of pro-
tection for computer programs. To the extent that the commercial
value of innovative programs resides in their dynamic behavioral
impact, these later decisions decline to treat a second comer's at-
tainment of functional equivalence as infringement simply because
of nonliteral similarities in "structure, sequence and organiza-
tion. 23
2
In the leading decision, Computer Associates International, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc., a panel on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected the notion that a computer program con-
tains a single idea, determined by its functional task, for purposes
of applying the idea-expression test in actions for infringement.233
Rather, the panel disaggregated an allegedly infringed program into
a hierarchy of sub-programs organized in descending levels of
229. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1289-90 (1991); Reichman, Programs as Know-How,
supra note 10, at 689-93, 693 n.288.
230. Software Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)).
231. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986) (broad copyright protection for elements of structure, sequence and organization),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740
F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990); Samuelson, supra note 102.
232. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., No. 92-1256, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27045 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 1993); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th
Cir. 1992); Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Servs., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir. 1987); see also Randall Davis, The Nature of Software and Its Consequences for
Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 299 (1992).
233. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d 693.
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abstraction. The panel then mandated application of a "successive
filtering" test to exclude ideas and other unprotectable matter at
234each level of abstraction. For example, courts following this
approach could not premise a finding of nonliteral copying on simi-
larities that pertain to sets of modules necessary for efficient opera-
tions, to structural architecture bearing on efficiency, or to any
technical ideas present in different structural subcomponents of the
programs at issue. Also excluded from the calculus of protected
expression are elements dictated by external factors, including stan-
dard programming techniques, mechanical specifications, compati-
bility requirements, manufacturers' design standards, and functional
demands of the industry being served.235 Two other federal appel-
late decisions make it easier for second comers pursuing their pri-
vate entrepreneurial interests to reverse engineer a copyrighted
computer program in order to reveal the underlying technical ideas
that anyone is free to use.236
234. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706-12. The successive filtering test was devel-
oped by David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Simi-
larity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 635-
51 (1988) and later incorporated into 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F] (rev. ed. 1992).
235. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706-12. See also Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d
at 1475-77 (endorsing "analytical dissection" of computer programs to isolate protectable
expression); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-41 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (applying Second Circuit's successive filtering test as consistent with Ninth Cir-
cuit's precedent in Brown Bag Software).
236. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari
Games, 975 F.2d 832. These cases hold that when circumstances unduly restrict access
to the noncopyrightable elements of a computer program, it is fair use for a potential
competitor to decompile publicly distributed object code in order to reconstruct the origi-
nator's undisclosed source code, so long as the second comer's end product does not
embody the originator's protected expression and there is no misappropriation of trade
secrets or any breach of fiduciary obligations. See Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary
Rights, supra note 102, at 88-93, 98-109; infra text accompanying notes 251-55. This
result follows from new and old Supreme Court decisions that prevent the exclusive
reproduction rights of copyright law from indirectly protecting unpatented technical ideas,
principles, processes, systems or methods of operation, which third parties must remain
free to reverse engineer. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989) (stressing competitor's
right to reverse engineer unpatented products); Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra
note 10, at 691-93, 693 n.288; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law
Professor in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1992).
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Taken together, these recent decisions have greatly expanded
both the scope of noncopyrightable components that second comers
can freely use and their ability to make intermediate copies for
purposes of reverse engineering, notwithstanding formal protection
of computer programs as literary works in United States copyright
law. Although program code and the surface expression of applica-
tions programs continues to qualify when they manifest creative
authorship,237 and wholesale duplication of any program is still
likely to infringe, the protection of internal structural elements and
of technical solutions that reside in operating systems programs or
in the relevant user interfaces will be cut back if present trends
continue.
If one then extrapolates these trends to the situation in develop-
ing countries, it suggests that software producers in these countries
need not feel unduly constrained in their choice of business strate-
gies by the copyright provisions of the Draft TRIPS Agreement.
To be sure, aggressive eradication of piratical copying could ad-
versely affect countries that possessed no appreciable technological
capabilities of their own in the software sector, and it could in-
crease their dependence on foreign suppliers. However, least-de-
veloped countries have ten years to build up their capabilities be-
fore the TRIPS provisions take effect, and they may adjust the
application of these provisions to their economic capabilities even
after the initial deferment has elapsed. 8
As regards developing countries that do possess a technological
Whether the European Communities' Directive on Software also allows reverse engineer-
ing for purposes of analytical use in addition to interoperability remains to be seen. See,
e.g., BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J. HART, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS IN EUROPE-A GUIDE TO THE EC DIRECTIVE 73-86 (1991); Linda G. Morrison,
Note, The EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs: Does It Leave
Room for Reverse Engineering Beyond the Need for Interoperability?, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1992).
237. See supra notes 214-15.
238. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 66(l); Draft Understanding on
Disputes, supra note 17, art. 22.1; Draft Final Act, supra note 17, § B(l) (Measures in




foundation in the software sector,239 overly broad application of
copyright norms to functional design solutions could hinder
reimplementation, recustomization, and systems integration at the
local level and could generally retard the pace of incremental im-
provements and adaptations. Because firms in developing countries
that reimplement foreign software designs often acquire copyright
interests of their own in the protectable components of these pro-
grams, both the foreign originator and the local adaptor may share
an interest in repressing piratical copies, as the Draft TRIPS Agree-
ment would require.24° These interests diverge with respect to the
desired scope of protection, however. Originators in developed
countries will want courts in developing countries to favor a broad
view of protected expression, while second comers in developing
countries will advocate free access to all technical design solutions
engineered abroad (but not necessarily for design solutions that
happen to be created locally). Second comers will also argue
against allowing foreign copyright owners to maintain unfettered
control over design solutions that become de facto standards in the
interests of greater compatibility between different operating sys-
tems and of lowering barriers to entry.24'
As matters now stand, nothing in the Draft TRIPS Agreement
impedes developing-country administrators or tribunals from fol-
lowing the more restrictive lines of foreign decisions concerning
copyright protection of computer programs.242 Nor must second
comers in developing countries overcome any greater legal obsta-
cles than those that small- and medium-sized firms generally face
when competing against established larger firms. The decision to
entrust the protection of computer programs to copyright law as
literary works with no corresponding prohibition against the copy-
ing of unprotectable functional components may thus boomerang
against its proponents at the international level. In effect, it en-
dows competitors in developing countries who are willing to master
239. See supra note 108 (describing software capabilities of developing countries).
240. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 9-13; see also Schware, supra
note 105, at 152; Gopinath & Ravishankar, supra note 105, at 12.
241. Cf., e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 98, at 138-43.
242. See supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
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lawful techniques of reverse engineering with promising prospects,
indeed, as will become clearer from the discussion of trade secret
law below. 43
Entrepreneurs in developing countries must, therefore, carefully
evaluate their strategic options. For example, they should avoid
cloning stylistically determined elements of, say, a foreign user
interface, but given the appropriate judicial support, they need not
refrain from cloning unpatented, functionally determined compo-
nents. In appropriate circumstances, they may reuse individual
commands or even the conventions for communication with other
programs. Access to standard solutions needed to achieve network-
ing efficiencies could be justified in the local context. Entrepre-
neurs also remain free to reverse-engineer technical ideas by "clean
room" procedures and to use those ideas in independently created
functional solutions of their own.2"
That these and similar techniques may remain legally permissi-
ble does not always make them the best strategic choices, however.
On the contrary, independent efforts to develop computer programs
that meet local industrial and administrative needs can pay bigger
dividends over time than reimplementing foreign products. More-
over, the potential benefits from obtaining the most up-to-date
software by means of direct investment, licensing or other arrange-
ments should always be weighed against either reimplementation
or independent creation.245
Meanwhile, the high cost of obtaining foreign computer pro-
grams for educational and training purposes could well become the
most pernicious consequence of strengthened copyright regimes, at
least until distant suppliers perceive the potential benefits of estab-
lishing local subsidiaries.246 Ironically, whereas the monopolistic
pricing of patented'computer programs can be challenged under
Article 31(b) of the Draft Agreement and unreasonably priced in-
243. See infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
244. Cf. supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Schware, supra note 105, at 150, 156-57; see also OTA REPORT 1992,
supra note 98, at 98-99.
246. See, e.g., Hamelink, supra note 224; supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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struction manuals would probably fall within existing concessions
to developing countries under the Appendix to the Berne Conven-
tion,247 no express provision has been made for compulsory licens-
es to reduce the costs of copyrighted computer programs for educa-
tional purposes. The developing countries may, therefore, press for
the inclusion of computer programs within the Berne Appendix at
future negotiations in the relevant multilateral forums.
248
III. ANCILLARY PROPRIETARY REGIMES
A. Trade Secrets
1. Acquisition of Technological Innovation Through Re-
verse Engineering
In modem economies driven by constant technological improve-
ment, trade secret law regulates the pace of competition by protect-
ing innovators against commercial bribery and industrial espionage
while endowing second comers with an absolute right to reverse-
engineer unpatented innovation.249 Assuming that any given inno-
vation fits within the operative definitions of "trade secret, ' 250 its
originator obtains no exclusive rights to make, use, sell or repro-
duce it in the manner of patents or of other statutory intellectual
property rights. Rather, third-party acquisition of secret knowledge
becomes actionable only when obtained by improper means, that
is to say, in ways that are excluded by private contractual agree-
ment or that violate a confidential relationship or that otherwise
247. See supra notes 124-132, 186-88 and accompanying text.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 335-39 (discussing framework for future
negotiations).
249. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); 2 ROGER M.
MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 7.0812][f] (rev. ed. 1992); Reichman, Overlap-
ping Proprietary Rights, supra note 102, at 93-98 (citing other authorities).
250. Under the standard model used in this country, state trade secret laws generally
cover "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information" that confers a business
advantage over competitors, so long as it is sufficiently definite and not commonly known
in the trade and so long as reasonable precautions are taken to preserve its secrecy. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4),
14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) [hereinafter UTSA]. For comparisons with the United Kingdom,
see ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 8-9 (1992) and
FRANCIS GuRRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 90-97 (1989).
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offend public policy. 251 Trade secrets that are voluntarily revealed,
insufficiently guarded or reverse-engineered lose all protection and
become subject to free competition. Producers who attempt contrac-
tually to limit the reverse engineering of unpatented innovation run
the risk that courts will hold such restrictions unenforceable.252
Because trade secret law reinstates the lead-time advantages
that a wrongful taking of undisclosed information may have neu-
tralized, it provides an incentive to develop incremental innovation
not meeting the nonobviousness standard of patent law.253 In the
United States, the economic importance of this function has led to
widespread adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which
largely overcomes obsolete conceptual distinctions between "torts"
and "property rights. 254 Article 39 of the Draft TRIPS Agreement,
which mandates some form of trade secret protection in all partici-
255pating countries, would probably require even the United States
251. See, e.g., UTSA, supra note 250, § 1(2); Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476, 490;
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner,
C.J.) (suggesting that federal patent law would preempt a theory that gave the trade secret
holder a property right valid against the world).
252. See, e.g., 2 MILGRIM, supra note 249, § 6.05; David A. Rice, Public Goods,
Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions
Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pir. L. REV. 543 (1992).
253. See, e.g., UTSA, supra note 250, § 2(b); 3 LADAS, supra note 152, at 1617;
David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, & Richard Posner, Some Economics of Trade
Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 70 (1991). See also Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683-93, 699-701, 711-23
(1983); John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4 (1962). The peculiarities of
trade secret law imply certain practical limitations that investors ignore at their peril.
Apart from the inherent risk of lawful reverse engineering, for example, the measures
necessary to maintain legal secrecy can become costly and burdensome over time and, at
the limit, they can hinder authorized third parties from efficiently exploiting the innova-
tion. Even when innovators prove misappropriation of their trade secrets to a court's
satisfaction, say, by showing that a competitor had bribed their employees, domestic
courts usually limit injunctive relief to the estimated period required for reverse engineer-
ing by fair means. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 179-80; Integrated Cash
Management Servs. v. Digital Transactions, 920 F.2d 171, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1990); see also
DRATLER, supra note 137, § 4.04[7][a].
254. See supra note 250; Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 178-79. See also S.J.
Soltysinski, Are Trade Secrets Property?, 17 I.I.C. 331, 339-45 (1986); Carlos M. Correa,
Legal Nature and Contractual Conditions in Know-How Transactions, II GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 449, 465-70 (1981).
255. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 39 ("Protection of Undisclosed
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to enact a federal trade secrets statute. Such a statute might deviate
from current practices under some state laws, and other countries
would remain free to provide a narrower range of protection than
some courts or legislatures have made available in the United
States.
An international obligation to enact trade secret legislation
would put developing-country entrepreneurs under no greater bur-
dens than those applicable to competitors elsewhere." 6 Without
conferring any protection against copying as such, it would entitle
these entrepreneurs to the same lead-time advantages that accrue to
entrepreneurs in developed countries and it would shield them all
Information"). Article 39 tracks the UTSA to a certain extent. Compare Draft TRIPS
Agreement, supra, art. 39(2) with UTSA, supra note 250, § 1(4). However, Article 39(2)
avoids the "improper means" language of the American model in favor of the test already
embodied in the Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 10 ' , viz. "in a manner contrary to
honest commercial practices." See also Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 39(1) (ex-
pressly incorporating by reference Paris Convention Article 10"' on unfair competition).
A footnote to Article 39(2) of the Draft Agreement states that for "the purposes of this
provision 'a manner contrary to honest commercial practices' shall mean at least practices
such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes
the acquisition of undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly
negligent in failing to know that such practices were involved in the acquisition." See
also Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 780-85, 784 n.154 (noting that the
phrase in question refers to "honest practices established in international trade," which
local custom cannot override).
256. Cf. Soltysinski, supra note 254, at 346-55. Historically, the protection of trade
secrets engenders fears that single innovators might create absolute and long-lasting
barriers to entry through nondisclosure of their discoveries. The patent system counters
this threat by encouraging full disclosure of technological breakthroughs in exchange for
short-term monopoly rights. The developing countries' attitude toward trade secret law
remains largely colored by this nineteenth century tradition, which to some extent rests
on the legendary figure of the solitary inventor. See, e.g., de Almeida, supra note 10, at
77.
In twentieth-century economies based on constant technological innovation and team
research conducted along scientific lines, often in universities or research institutes, the
ability of any single firm to prevent others from duplicating undisclosed research results
after an initial breakthrough has greatly diminished. As the distinction between theoreti-
cal and applied science also breaks down, a tendency to embody applied scientific know-
how in products distributed on the open market shortens product cycles and leads to prob-
lems of chronic underprotection. See e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note
10, at 656-69 ("Incremental Innovation Bearing Know-How on Its Face"); infra text
accompanying notes 260-63.
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from certain unethical conduct within the larger framework of Arti-
cle 10bN of the Paris Convention.257 The enactment of such regimes
should, therefore, stimulate local innovation besides facilitating
various forms of foreign investment.258
To operate successfully under statutory trade secret laws, the
developing countries must realign the concept of "transfer of tech-
nology" with the nature of competition in open markets. From this
perspective, technology is neither given away in response to altruis-
tic promptings of foreign policy nor is it acquired by industrial
espionage or by copycat duplication that avoids contributions to the
actual cost of research and' development. Rather, unlicensed tech-
nology is transferred through self-help methods of reverse engineer-
ing; and the international regime of trade secret protection would
legitimate this practice against future complaints from those
oligopolistic enterprises whose initial comparative advantages were
subsequently eroded.
Some, of course, will argue that the developing countries lack
capacity to reverse engineer by proper means, and no one can deny
that they face formidable handicaps or that their limited technologi-
cal infrastructures foster dependence on foreign technologies. Yet,
one should not overemphasize traditional handicaps associated with
closed economies when assessing competitive prospects in open
economies, if only because the skills needed to reverse-engineer
foreign technologies are available on the global labor market.
Although successful reverse engineering requires investment
and risk taking, it can pay handsome dividends. For example, it
roots the technology in the local culture, which provides a basis for
future research and development. It stimulates improvements on
the original technology or local adaptations of little interest to dis-
tant suppliers, and it often leads to lower priced, substitute prod-
ucts. Local adaptations and improvements may have export poten-
257. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., IPRs and FDI, supra note 23, at 32; Correa, supra note 254, at 452-
54, 468; see also Robert M. Sherwood, A Microeconomic View of Intellectual Property




tial as well. If so, domestic firms that had acquired export capacity
through reverse engineering would normally avoid foreign border
control measures levied against exporters of counterfeit goods; and
they would also avoid export restrictions applicable to firms that
produced patented goods locally under the compulsory licenses that
the Draft TRIPS'Agreement elsewhere continues to authorize.259
.2. The Know-How Gap in TRIPS
The potential dividends accruing from the reverse-engineering
of unpatented, noncopyrightable technologies in general are magni-
fied many times over when the newest cutting-edge technologies
are at stake, notably biogenetic engineering, computer programs,
computer-aided design, and other information-based endeavors.
This follows because the applied scientific know-how underlying
these important new technologies' is often embodied in tangible
products distributed in the open market, which renders classical
trade secret protection of doubtful efficacy. Because each of these
products "bears its know-how on its face," third parties who law-
fully obtain some physical embodiment of that know-how can
counter the originator's initial competitive advantage by reverse
engineering his or her unpatented, noncopyrightable information
and by incorporating it into lower-priced substitute products of
their own making.26
Paradoxically, today's most refined technical achievements are
often among the most accessible to reverse engineering, which
threatens lead time to the point of discouraging investment in re-
search and development. On the one hand, patent law excludes the
bulk of new technological innovation that represents routine or
.merely incremental advances over the prior art.26 1 On the other
hand, because of their functional character, the new technologies
are alien to the spirit of copyright law, which traditionally avoids
intruding on the domain of industrial property law.262 The recent
259. See supra text accompanying notes 126-35, 156-62.
260. Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 10, at 656-62 ("Incremental
Innovation Bearing Know-How on Its Face").
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
262. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 114, at 349-61.
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United States cases limiting copyright protection of computer pro-
grams illustrate this principle.26 3
To address this problem, the developed countries will either
have to formulate sui generis laws to protect applied scientific
know-how or negotiate restrictions on the reverse-engineering of
unpatented, noncopyrightable technologies within the framework of
international unfair competition law. In the meantime, by ignoring
the problem of applied scientific know-how as such, the Draft
TRIPS Agreement has left a gap in the international legal protec-
tion of high technology.2 4  This gap provides entrepreneurs in
developing countries with major opportunities, notwithstanding the
international obligation to protect trade secrets under the Draft
TRIPS Agreement, provided that they are willing and able to mas-
ter the art of reverse-engineering that is crucial to present-day com-
petition in the rest of the world.265
Perhaps the biggest threat to these opportunities, besides tech-
nological lag, is the aggressive licensing tactics of foreign innova-
tors, who will try to limit the effective transfer of technology by
contractual agreement.266 However, avoiding abusive licensing
agreements concerning the transfer of know-how requires nuanced
legal criteria that often differ from those applicable to cases in
which misuse of patents is alleged. In some respects, the inherent
vulnerability of unpatented innovation to reverse engineering by
263. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, Overlapping
Proprietary Rights, supra note 102, at 88-101.
264. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 875 (advocating emer-
gency anti-piracy agreement for applied scientific know-how within Article 10 " of Paris
Convention and predicting this gap).
265. See supra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 166-72, 219-225 and accompanying text; infra notes 370-71 and
accompanying text. In the European Community, contractual restrictions on the transfer
of undisclosed technological know-how are strictly regulated in the interest of free compe-
tition. See, e.g., GUILLERMO CABANELLAS & JOSI MASSAGUER, KNOW-HOW AGREE-
MENTS AND EEC COMPETITION LAW 57-238 (1991); VALENTINE KORAH, KNow-How
LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION 556/89
(1989); see also Hanns Ullrich, Patents and Know-How, Free Trade, Interenterprise
Cooperation and Competition Within the Internal European Market, 23 I.I.C. 583 (1992).
In the United States, courts take a case-by-case approach and usually apply a rule of
reason. See, e.g., 2 MILGRIM, supra note 249, § 6.05.
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third parties should entitle licensors of know-how to greater con-
tractual freedom than administrators would tolerate in the case of
patents. Tough restrictions in know-how agreements that apply for
a very short period of time may thus pass muster even though they
would not be upheld if applied to licensees of patented inventions.
In other respects, contractual limits on know-how licensees are
more severely regulated than those applicable to patent licensees
because courts and administrators may see them as unreasonably
curtailing the public's right to reverse engineer unpatented innova-
tion.
Developing countries that regulate know-how licensing agree-
ments must, therefore, proceed with particular caution lest they
unduly inhibit foreign firms from bringing or disclosing the desired
technology. For example, regulations that limit contractual restric-
tions on a licensee's use of know-how once it becomes publicly
known are defensible, as are measures to counter so-called "shrink-
wrap" licenses that impede purchasers from reverse-engineering
mass-produced, publicly distributed software.267 In contrast, agree-
ments that constrain licensees from reverse-engineering undisclosed
components of the transferred technology or from using that same
technology for a fixed period after expiration of the agreement may
prove economically reasonable in particular cases. Such clauses
alleviate the licensor's fears of having to compete with his own
licensees, who are privy to his secrets, as well as with third parties
who reverse-engineer on their own.268
By the same token, proposals to register trade secrets for ad-
ministrative purposes 269 risk vitiating the incentives to innovation
and its diffusion that inhere in trade secret laws without conferring
267. Cf. Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 39(2); see also Soltysinski,
supra note 254, at 355-56; Rice, supra note 252.
268. But see Correa, supra note 254, at 487-89 (reviewing authorities on both sides,
but agreeing with those who would forbid clauses restricting use after expiration of the
license agreement).
269. See, e.g., David Silverstein, Patent Protection and Technology Transfer in Less-
Developed Countries: A Reappraisal of the Legal Framework for Producing and Trans-
mitting Knowledge 384-93 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy (Tufts University)).
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any solid proprietary interest sufficient to overcome risk aversion.
In general, developing countries stand to gain more from hybrid
legal regimes that directly reward disclosures of unpatented tech-
nologies, such as utility model laws and so-called patents of intro-
duction, as discussed below, than from legal restrictions on trade
secrets as such.270
In sum, developing-country regulators will increasingly need to
strike a delicate balance between the licensor's need to preserve
reasonable lead-time advantages and the would-be competitor's
need to implement his or her right to reverse-engineer unpatented
technologies. To achieve this balance, regulators must be prepared
to tolerate short-term licensing constraints, while taking pains to
defend lawful forms of reverse engineering that are recognized in
developed countries. Ideally, both developed and developing coun-
tries would coordinate their efforts in regulating know-how licens-
ing agreements within the consultative framework that Article 40
of the Draft TRIPS Agreement seeks to establish.2 7 1
B. Other Proprietary Regimes
The Draft TRIPS Agreement mandates intellectual property
protection for industrial designs, plant varieties, and integrated
circuit designs.272 A priori, one may assume that the developed
countries would not have pressed for the inclusion of these instru-
mentalities without expectations of gaining from them. Neverthe-
less, policymakers in developing countries must avoid the tendency
to view any positive intellectual property benefit for developed
countries as necessitating a loss to themselves, in the same way
that the developed countries' negotiators must desist from charac-
terizing the developing countries' acquisition of technology as a
loss to the former's own economic establishment. The real deter-
minants of competitive success in these fields seldom hinge on
intellectual property rights, and the effects of these rights vary
270. See infra text accompanying notes 306-23.
271. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 40; infra text accompanying
notes 368-71.
272. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 25-26 (industrial designs),
27(3)(b) (plant varieties), 35-38 (integrated circuit designs).
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considerably even among developed countries whose technical
infrastructures appear comparatively homogeneous.
In principle, intellectual property laws rooted in modest require-
ments of creativity allow the market to determine value. They tend,
therefore, to broaden access to markets and to provide a sweep-
stakes reward that any entrepreneurs who enter the game might
win,273 provided that contenders possess the technological founda-
tion to play at all and the ability to overcome other barriers to
entry.
1. Industrial Designs
The developed countries enjoy a clear advantage in advanced
sectors of industrial design. However, more traditional sectors of
design rooted in aesthetic appeal rather than technical efficiency
remain wholly accessible to firms in developing countries. Local
designers can profit from indigenous cultural resources not readily
available to foreign competitors, and designs so inspired may have
potential export value as well. To the extent that local firms in-
vesting in design development need to hire foreign expertise, a
design protection law diminishes risk aversion by deterring free-
riders from unlicensed imitation until the innovator has obtained
the opportunity to recoup his or her investment.274
Given the continuing lack of international consensus concerning
this subject,275 participating states remain free to draft their design
protection laws with local objectives in mind. Such laws need not
recognize functionally determined designs, despite a European trend
in this direction,276 although textile designs must be protected either
in a design law or in copyright law.277
Current United States law appears to accommodate both of
273. Cf., e.g., Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 152, at 138-45.
274. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 282-84 (1992) [hereinafter Reichman, Legislative Agenda].
275. See, e.g., Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 152, at 8-10,
123-35.
276. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 25(1); infra notes 278, 285 and
accompanying text.
277. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 25(2).
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these properties. 278  However, Article 25(1) of the Draft TRIPS
Agreement requires parties to "provide for the protection of inde-
pendently created industrial designs that are new or original,"279
whereas United States design patent law requires candidate designs
to meet both a novelty and a true nonobviousness standard.280 The
TRIPS drafters clearly intended "originality" to entail more of a
creative contribution than mere independent creation because they
used the two terms to convey different meanings in the same provi-
sion.28  "Originality" in foreign design law normally signifies less
than nonobviousness, although until recently the two terms were
more or less synonymous under the United Kingdom's registered
design law of 1949, which resembled the United States design
patent law.282 Nevertheless, given the drafters' deliberate emphasis
278. For the exclusion of functionally dictated designs from the design patent law,
which protects ornamental designs of useful articles, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (1988);
Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 152, at 37-42, 47-53. Original
fabric designs, which would not normally qualify for design patent protection in the
United States, are eligible for copyright protection as pictorial works, although dress
designs are not. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(b) (1988) (definition of pictorial, graph-
ic and sculptural works and limits of protection); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954);
Reichman, supra, at 59-61. Most three-dimensional designs of useful articles are not
protected in United States intellectual property law at all because they either fail to meet
the novelty and nonobviousness criteria of patent law or they contain no copyrightable,
aesthetic features that can exist separately from, and independently of, their utilitarian
aspects. See Reichman, supra, at 45-81. However, three-dimensional product designs are
frequently protected for an unlimited time as "appearance trade dress" under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, which operates as a de facto federal law of unfair competition. See
id. at 81-123; see also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1341 (1987); J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design
Protection Law-A Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387, 392
(1993).
279. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 25(1).
280. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 171 (1988); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe
Co., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Braun, Inc. v. Dynam-
ics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Avia Group Int'l v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,
853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see generally Reichman, Designs and New Technologies,
supra note 152, at 20-36, 45-51.
281. See supra text accompanying note 279 (quoting Draft TRIPS Agreement, Article
25(1)).
282. See, e.g., Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 152, at 20-30
(comparing criteria of eligibility in foreign design laws with those of United States), 34-
51 (evolution of eligibility standards in domestic design patent law), 148-51 (evolution
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on "nonobviousness" in the patent provisions of the Draft Agree-
ment and on "originality" in its design protection provisions,283 one
must conclude that the latter criterion conflicts with the eligibility
requirements of the domestic design patent law.
Article 25 thus appears to represent a backhanded attempt to
oblige Congress to align the legal protection of industrial designs
in this country with more protectionist trends abroad, despite the
failure of sectoral lobbyists to achieve a similar result in recent
years.284 In this connection, efforts to harmonize the design laws
of the European Community could lead to widespread protection of
functional designs in sui generis laws more or less modelled on the
United Kingdom's unregistered design law of 1988.28" This law
protects both functional and aesthetic designs against copying for
a period of ten to fifteen years while imposing only the soft sub-
of design protection law in the United Kingdom). Under the United Kingdom's Regis-
tered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 88, amended by Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 48, §§ 265-273 [hereinafter RDA of 1949], the criterion
of "originality" as applied by courts was akin to that of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Chris-
tine Fellner, The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 369,
372-75 (1989-1990). While the RDA of 1949 remains in effect, see infra note 285 and
accompanying text, despite adoption in the U.K. of a second law protecting unregistered
designs since 1988, the eligibility criteria of the RDA appear to have been softened by
the elimination of "originality." The precise degree of novelty still to be required remains
uncertain. See Fellner, supra, at 388-89; Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, su-
pra, at 149 n.948 (citing other authorities).
283. Compare Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(1) (providing that
patentable "inventions ... are new, involve an inventive step [i.e., "nonobviousness," as
explained in footnote 1 to this same Article] and are capable of industrial application")
with id. art. 25(1) (requiring parties to protect "independently created industrial designs
that are new or original").
284. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection for Designs, 19 U. BALT.
L. REV. 308 (1989-1990); James F. Fitzpatrick, Industrial Design Protection and Competi-
tion in Automobile Replacement Parts-Back to Monopoly Profits?, 19 U. BALT. L. REV.
233 (1989-1990); Reichman, Legislative Agenda, supra note 274, at 292-96. But see, e.g.,
William T. Fryer, III, Industrial Design Protection in the United States of Ameri-
ca-Present Situation and Plans for Revision, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 198 (1989-1990) (ap-
proving these proposals).
285. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 48, §§ 213-264
(U.K.) (unregistered design right applicable to both functional and aesthetic designs);
Fellner, supra note 282, at 377. For the European Commission's proposals along these
lines, see Hugh Griffiths, Overview of Developments in Europe on Industrial Design
Protection, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359 (1993).
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stantive and formal characteristics of copyright laws generally.286
The Draft TRIPS Agreement in its present form would not require
any participating country to adopt a similar model. However, once
a reform of the United States design patent law became necessary
by dint of Article 25, the trend favoring copyright-like protection
of functional designs displaying no appreciable quantum of creativ-
ity could appear irresistible despite its overall anticompetitive ef-
fects. 287
Meanwhile, exporters in both developed and developing coun-
tries should note that designs meeting the requirements of domestic
design laws could nonetheless violate foreign design laws based on
different criteria. For example, exported designs could sometimes
violate the United Kingdom's unregistered design right, which pro-
tects both functional and appearance designs, as well as copyright
laws, especially' in France, or laws that treat three-dimensional
product configurations as unregistered trademarks, especially in the
United States.288
2. Plant Varieties
As noted' earlier, the revised UPOV Convention framework,
incorporated by reference into the Draft TRIPS Agreement, allows
(and sometimes requires) participating countries to protect new and
distinctive plant varieties outside of the domestic patent laws.2 89
But this option, ,after the 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention,
may also provide both foreign and domestic breeders with a stron-
ger, more patent-like form of protection than was previously avail-
able under the sui generis approach. 2 °
The developing countries as a whole reportedly stand to gain
more from protecting plant breeders' rights under the UPOV Con-
vention framework than under the domestic patent laws.291 Howev-
286. See generally Fellner, supra note 282, at 377-88.
287. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5; supra notes 283-84 and
accompanying text.
288. See generally Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 152, at 8-
10, 81-123, 126-35; supra notes 278, 285.
289. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Lesser, supra note 73, at 68; Frischtak, supra note 80, at 13-15.
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er, the long-term economic effects of the 1991 amendments to the
UPOV Convention on these countries remain to be evaluated. The
farmers' obligation to pay royalties for the use of certain hybrid
food varieties has already stirred resentment in some developing
countries and, to the extent that foreign firms continue to dominate
the trade, such resentment could grow.292
By the same token, the United States will have to decide
whether to revise its Plant Variety Protection Act2 93 in order to take
advantage of the amended UPOV Convention treaty. Besides al-
lowing for the imposition of a longer and stronger form of protec-
tion, these amendments permit cumulation of the patent and sui
generis approaches, which domestic law currently forbids. 94
3. Integrated Circuit Designs
In effect, integrated circuit laws modelled on the United States
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984295 provide a glorified
form of trade secret protection augmented by a specific anti-copy-
ing provision. An exclusive right of reproduction prevents compet-
itors from duplicating a protected chip as such. But an absolute
right to reverse engineer permits reproduction for analytical use
when it leads to independently created chip designs. 296 The chip
laws thus preserve an originator's lead time against outright copy-
ing, while encouraging second comers to abbreviate that lead time
by rapid reverse engineering and by fashioning the improvements
to which it naturally leads.297
The Draft TRIPS Agreement largely tracks the Washington
Treaty on Integrated Circuits ("Washington Treaty"), opened for
292. See, e.g., Dasgupta, supra note 83, at 855-58; supra notes 89-90 and accompa-
nying text.
293. See PVPA, supra note 73.
294. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
295. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620 98 Stat. 3335,
3347 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
296. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 905(1)-(2), 906(a)(1) (1988); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
297. See, e.g., Leo J. Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair
Use, 70 MINN. L. REV. 385, 402 (1985); see also Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary
Rights, supra note 102, at 110-16.
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signature in 1989, which means that developing countries could
incur burdensome administrative obligations to police articles that
incorporate allegedly infringing semiconductor chip designs.298
Article 35 of the Draft Agreement appears to exclude the broad
compulsory license provisions sought by the developing countries
during negotiations on the Washington Treaty. But Article 37(2)
rather offhandedly leaves the door open to unspecified public-inter-
est regulations, including the compulsory licenses allowed for in-
voluntary use of patents under Article 3 1.299
Except in special circumstances pertaining to unreasonably
priced imports, the presence or absence of compulsory licenses
should little affect an entrepreneur's innovative prospects in view
of his or her right to reverse engineer a protected chip and to apply
its teaching to independently created chip designs .3 00 Technical
barriers to entry remain formidable, however, even if legal barriers
are not. The increased complexity of chip design in recent years,
the correspondingly higher costs of development and production,
and the increasingly incestuous relations between purchasers and
manufacturers all tend to limit the prospects for developing coun-
tries in this field.'O° By the same token, enactment of chip laws in
298. See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, opened for
signature May 26, 1989, arts. 2, 3(1)(b), 28 I.L.M. 1477, 1485 [hereinafter IPIC Treaty];
Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 35 (incorporating IPIC Treaty, supra, arts.
2-7 (but not 6.3), 12, 16(3)), 36, 37 (exempting innocent infringers); see also Carlos M.
Correa, Intellectual Property in the Field of Integrated Circuits: Implications for Devel-
oping Countries, 14 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 83, 93-96 (Dec. 1990).
299. Compare Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 35 (excluding art. 6(3)
of IPIC Treaty) with IPIC Treaty, supra note 298, art. 6(3)(a) (compulsory licenses in
general) and id. art. 6(3)(b) (compulsory licenses concerning free competition and abuses);
see also Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra, arts. 31(a)-(k), 37(2), 40(2); supra text accompa-
nying notes 117-46.
300. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984 and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry, 75 J. PAT &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 93, 121 (1993); Correa, supra note 298, at 84-86. Nevertheless,
South Korea and Taiwan Province of China have reportedly made inroads on the market.
Other developing countries in Asia and Latin America have established some capacity for
the production of custom and semi-custom chips by adopting appropriate CAD (computer-




developing countries seems unlikely to increase foreign investment
in this sector because other technological and economic factors
remain of paramount importance. 302
4. Miscellaneous Hybrid Regimes
The push for sui generis laws to protect integrated circuit de-
signs has implanted a protectionist virus at the heart of the world's
intellectual property system, which nominally rests on the patent
and copyright models enshrined in the Paris and Berne Conven-
303 Teeftions. The effects of this virus appear in the United Kingdom's
decision to confer copyright-like protection on functional designs
in 1988, a conceptually anomalous solution that the Commission of
the European Communities appears ready to endorse. 304 These ad
hoc responses to a deepening systemic crisis beg the question of
why certain functional designs merit an exemption from the disci-
pline of the marketplace more than other classes of socially valu-
able innovation that are no less vulnerable to free-riding duplica-
tors. They also look increasingly like the disguised barriers to
trade that Article XX(d) of the GATT aimed to forestall.30 5
By the same token, nothing prevents developing countries from
adopting hybrid legal regimes, with a view to modifying the incen-
tive structures of present-day patent systems along the lines of
historical models that many industrialized countries favored at
earlier stages of their economic development.3°  Utility model
laws, patents of introduction and industrial development patents
merit particular attention in this context.
a. Utility models
The pristine purpose of early utility model laws was to protect
functional improvements of handtools and other everyday imple-
ments, including agricultural implements, that were achieved by
302. See, e.g., IPRs and FDI, supra note 23, at 31-32.
303. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 114, at 326-35, 349-60.
304. See supra notes 276, 285-87 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., Reichman, GAT Connection, supra note 8, at 831-36, 884-85 (dis-
cussing relation of GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d) to TRIPS).
306. See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 269, at 305-06; Bercovitz-Rodriguez, supra
note 9, at 2-3.
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relatively novel, three-dimensional forms or shapes that typically
lacked the inventive step required for patent protection. °7 For
example, the object of protection under Germany's prototypical
utility model law was the external product configuration responsi-
ble for a technically more proficient tool or implement, and not the
underlying technical idea or process involved.30 8 Such laws were
of primary interest to local inventors, especially small- and medi-
um-sized firms that adapted or improved foreign products.3 9
Over time, utility model laws degenerated into longer and stron-
ger petty patent regimes governing small inventions generally, 10
which contradicts the economic and policy rationales that justify
the patent monopoly.3 1  These laws provide virtually immediate,
307. See, e.g., 2 LADAS, supra note 152, at 949-56. The prototypical regime was the
German Utility Model Act of June 1, 1891, which remained largely unchanged until the
Act to Amend the Utility Model Act of Aug. 28, 1986 (BGBI. I, 1446), reprinted as
revised in GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS 72-81
(Friedrich-Karl Beier et al. eds., 2d rev. ed. 1989) [hereinafter GERMAN INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY LAWS]. The German Act was further amended in 1990. See generally Roland
Liesegang, German Utility Models After the 1990 Reform Act, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3-4
(1992). See also Decree No. 1411 on Models and Designs of Aug. 25, 1940 [Italy], as
amended May 23, 1977, June 27, 1979 & Feb.' 14, 1987, in CODICE DELLA PROPRIETA
INDUSTRIALE E DEL DIRITO D'AUTORE (Mario Fabiani ed., 1990); Utility Model Law
[Japan], Law No. 123 of Apr. 13, 1959, as amended through 1990, reprinted in JAPANESE
LAWS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 79-118 (AIPPA Japan ed., 1992). For sum-
maries of these and other utility model laws, see DESIGNS AND UTILITY MODELS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Anne Marie Greene ed., 1992).
308. See, e.g., E. Hdusser, Utility Models: The Experience of the Federal Republic
of Germany, 26 INDUS. PROP. 314 (1987).,
309. See, e.g., Liesegang, supra note 307, at 2-4; Friedrich-Karl Beier, Introduction,
in GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS, supra note 307, at 10.
310. Both the Japanese and Italian authorities encouraged this evolution by relaxing
the requirement of a three-dimensional shape as such. See, e.g., TERUO DoI, THE INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 68-70 (1980); GIUSEPPE SENA, I DIRrrTI SULLE
INVENZIONI E SUI MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 515-549 (2d ed. 1984). The latest reform of the
German utility model law, which took effect on July 1, 1990, abolished this requirement
altogether and made electronic circuit designs eligible for the first time. See, e.g., Liese-
gang, supra note 307, at 3-4. Electronic circuit designs now qualify for utility model
protection in Japan as well. See, e.g., Sadanao Amemiya & Kikuo Nishimoto, Patents
and Utility Models, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, ch. 2, § 2.01[9][c] (Zentaro Kitagawa
ed., 1990). Chemical substances, foodstuffs and immovables also became practicable
under the German reform, but methods remain excluded. See Liesegang, supra, at 3-4.
31 1. See, e.g., FRANCOIS PERRET, L'AUTONOMIE DU R9GIME DE PROTECTION DES
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patent-like protection for a relatively short period of time, which
now averages six to ten years. Eligibility standards resemble those
of patent law, although courts tend to apply a softer merit test than
that of nonobviousness; the standard of novelty is less absolute;
and there is usually no substantive examination of the prior art.312
Recent amendments to the German law codify these lower stan-
dards of eligibility.31 3
Developing countries are well advised to adopt utility model
laws because of their proven efficacy in stimulating local adapta-
tion and improvement of foreign inventions.3 4 The advent of man-
datory patent regimes under the Draft TRIPS Agreement further
validates this advice because governments in developing countries
will want to encourage firms in the private sector to work around
the deluge of patents likely to be filed in the future. Countries that
adopt utility model laws must, however, provide foreign innovators
with national treatment and with the priority rights established
under the Paris Convention. 5
b. Patents of introduction
Authorities in developing countries may consider more innova-
tive measures to encourage both foreign patentees to work their
patents locally and nonpatentees (whether local or foreign) to intro-
duce technologies that, for one reason or another, are not technical-
ly patentable under local law. For example, patents of introduc-
tion31 6 can be used to encourage domestic commercialization of
DESSINS ET MODtLES 188-95, 231-33 (1974).
312. See, e.g., Liesegang, supra note 307, at 2-5; see also DOI, supra note 310, at
68-70, 73-75; Mario Fabiani, I Modelli e disegni industriali, in 2 TITO RAVA, DIRrrTO
INDUSTRIALE-INVENZIONI E MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 213, 216-22 (Mario Fabiani & Paolo
Spada eds., 1988).
313. See, e.g., Hdusser, supra note 308; Liesegang, supra note 307.
314. See, e.g., Robert E. Evenson, Survey of Empirical Studies, in STRENGTHENING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 33, 41-42; Lesser, An Overview of Intellectual
Property Systems, in STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra, at 5, 7-8.
315. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 2(1), 3; Paris Convention,
supra note 27, arts. 1(2), 2(1), 4C(1).
316. "Patents of importation (sometimes also called patents of introduction, confirma-
tion or revalidation) are generally patents of relatively short duration granted for an inven-
tion... already... patented in a foreign country .... [Such an invention] therefore has
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foreign technologies when the relevant utility patents have not been
filed locally within the priority periods set by the Paris Conven-
tion.317 In such cases, developing countries can award patents of
introduction either to the foreign patentee, notwithstanding a techni-
cal loss of novelty, or to nonpatentees (whether foreigners or na-
tionals) willing and able to step into their shoes, on condition that
grantees commit to working their special patents locally within a
reasonable period of time.318
To some extent, the Draft TRIPS Agreement has diminished the
attractiveness of patents of introduction by overriding the local
working requirements of the Paris Convention and by ensuring that
patentees who file timely applications will obtain an exclusive right
to supply even developing-country markets with reasonably priced
imports. 319 As a result, a threat by government authorities to issue
patents of introduction in the absence of local working would no
longer dissuade foreign patentees who had properly filed and ob-
tained domestic utility patents from supplying the market by im-
ports alone, although such patentees would remain subject to com-
pulsory licenses if they charged excessive prices for their im-
ports.320 Developing countries can still issue patents of introduction
for foreign technologies that are not the object of timely patent
applications in the countries concerned, and this could constitute a
sizeable pool for some countries to work with, especially least-
developed countries.
c. Industrial development patents
Adoption of a TRIPS agreement could also focus fresh attention
on the "industrial development patent," which the World Intellectu-
al Property Organization ("WIPO") proposed in 1974, precisely
lost its novelty, but is nevertheless protected by a patent of importation in the expectation
that the patentee will exploit the invention in the country concerned." BODENHAUSEN,
supra note 119, at 26. See also Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 1(4) (recognizing
patents of importation [i.e., introduction] as patents for purposes, inter alia, of determining
the objects of industrial property protection under Article 1(2) that are subject to national
treatment, plus any international minimum standards that may or may not apply).
317. See Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 4.
318. See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 269, at 245-47, 305-09; 3 LADAS, supra note
152, at 1898-99, 1902-03; Bercovitz-Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 2-3.
319. See supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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because this regime provides incentives for local working of unpat-
ented technologies that could help to reduce the developing coun-
tries' dependence on imports.3z' Such patents can be granted to
any persons or firms, whether foreigners or nationals, who agree to
establish operations in a developing country for the purpose of
producing goods that are neither patented nor manufactured there
already or of employing technological processes that are neither
patented nor already used in the country concerned.
In practice, industrial development patents would replace the
objective novelty and nonobviousness criteria of the mature patent
system with softer criteria, tailor-made for local needs, in return for
substantial investment in unpatented technologies not yet intro-
duced locally. While similar in effect to some utility model re-
gimes, they remain free of the historical baggage that links utility
models with industrial design.322 Industrial development patents
would operate rather like short-term, contractually guaranteed ex-
clusive licenses from the state that override the public-domain
status of specific technological products and that enable grantees
to exclude imports of similar products from abroad. States granting
these titles could thus stimulate local working of unpatented tech-
nologies without violating the Draft TRIPS Agreement in its pres-
ent form.
The Draft Agreement also allows member states to devise intel-
lectual property laws that exceed the requirements of prevailing
international minimum standards.323 Developing countries that avail
themselves of this privilege could provide special incentives to
encourage private investment in sectors targeted for rapid develop-
ment. However, both patents of introduction and industrial devel-
opment patents have more to offer than ad hoc initiatives of this
kind, and the case for resurrecting a limited monopoly for foreign-
ers who teach the adaptation of alien technology locally deserves
greater attention than it has so far received, especially in least-de-
321. See, e.g., 3 LADAS, supra note 152, at 1903 n.29a (discussing WIPO Doc.
AT/PC/I/8 of Mar. 22, 1974 and ICC Doc. 450/378).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 307-08.
323. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1(1).
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veloped countries.
IV. INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTO INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
A. Ongoing Trade-Based Initiatives
Global economic integration requires that intangible creations,
likely to become the most valuable form of property in the twenty-
first century, should gradually be absorbed into the laws of state
responsibility that otherwise protect alien property from confisca-
tion and unlawful takings:
To pretend that aliens have no legal claims arising from
wholesale, unauthorized uses of their most valuable proper-
ty while respecting laws that protect less valuable alien
property only because it is tangible rather than intangible is
to exalt form over substance. Sooner or later, both private
and public international law must assimilate intellectual
property rights to the general international minimum stan-
dards that preserve comity by dissuading states from autho-
rizing uncompensated uses of alien property on their nation-
al territories. 24
As international minimum standards of intellectual property law
become at least justiciable, if not enforceable, within the frame-
work of the GATT' s dispute-settlement procedures,325 the historical
predilection for purely territorial intellectual property rights will
give way to international economic law at some cost to national
sovereignty.
Viewed in its most positive light, a transnational market for
intellectual goods defended against free-riding imports by border
control measures and by international machinery for the settlement
of disputes could become a vehicle for implementing cultural and
industrial policies on a grand scale. The larger rewards potentially
accruing from successful innovation under these conditions could
324. Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 810-11; see generally id. 806-12
(citing authorities).
325. See infra text accompanying notes 347-59.
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be factored into the aggregate investment calculus for research and
development and for the dissemination of cultural products. To the
extent that intellectual property laws overcome high risk-aversion
by offering prospectors a kind of sweepstakes reward if they suc-
ceed,326 the stimulus afforded by minimum standards of legal pro-
tection operating across an enlarged and relatively undistorted mar-
ket could greatly exceed that of similar laws operating in national
markets that pursue different goals by different legal means. The
ability of each legal subsystem to project more efficient uses of
intellectual property throughout, the worldwide domain governed by
a TRIPS Agreement could thus magnify the capacity of the system
as a whole to attain progressively higher levels of competition in
the long run through appropriate short term restrictions on free
competition.327
On the negative side, the norms of international economic law
represent a delicate balance between the interests of states at differ-
ent stages of development, and the absorption of intellectual prop-
erty will have to accommodate these norms and that balance.328 To
the extent that an integrated world market becomes increasingly
open and competitive, the desired equilibrium between legal protec-
tion of innovation and free competition must take account of the
different economic policies of states at very different stages of
development. Premature efforts to accelerate the process of harmo-
nization without due regard to these differences and to the social
costs of overcoming them 329 could boomerang against those coun-
tries pressing for rapid change and could even widen the initial dif-
ferences in the end.
1. Compensation as the New Master Principle
Developing countries fear that extraterritorial application of
high-as distinct from minimum-international standards of intel-
326. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1977).
327. Cf. Lehmann, supra note 66.
328. See generally Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 812-27.
329. See, e.g., Ullrich, supra note 7, at 140 (criticizing industrialized countries for
attempting by "trade muscle ... to achieve on a global level what European countries
have only achieved on a very narrow scale within decades of continuous harmonization
efforts").
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lectual property protection will become a vehicle that allows the
technology-exporting countries to wield industrial property control
over both their domestic markets and the import markets of third
countries.330  To bolster their prospects, the developing countries
must ensure that both enhanced market access and technical coop-
eration to implement a TRIPS agreement are actually delivered as
promised.331  They should insist that the developed countries re-
nounce unilateral trade sanctions in future discussions of intellec-
tual property protection, in conformity with Article 64 of the Draft
TRIPS Agreement and with Articles 21 and 22 of the Draft Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT ("Draft Un-
derstanding on Disputes") to be incorporated into the Final Act of
the Uruguay Round.332 The developing countries may also avail
themselves of the transitional provisions in Articles 65-67 of the
Draft TRIPS Agreement, while least-developed countries may in-
voke the longer transitional periods of Article 66(1) and are further
entitled to benefit from special incentives favoring the transfer of
technology under Article 66(2). 3
Nevertheless, one cannot realistically assume that the developed
countries will relax their efforts to elevate international minimum
standards of intellectual property protection once a TRIPS agree-
ment has been signed, nor is it certain that they will altogether
330. See, e.g., id. at 158-59; see also CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZA-
TION-GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND & THE THIRD WORLD 114-41, 270-71 (1990);
Dasgupta, supra note 83, at 855-58.
331. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 67 (pledging developed coun-
tries to provide technical and financial assistance to both developing and least-developed
countries); see also RAGHAVAN, supra note 330, at 273-78.
332. See Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, arts. 21 (Strengthening of
Multilateral System), 22 (Special Procedures involving Least-Developed Contracting
Parties); see also Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 64 (incorporating an Inte-
grated Dispute Settlement Understanding by reference).
333. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 65 (Transitional Arrange-
ments), 66 (Least-Developed Countries), 67 (Technical Cooperation). Article 66(2)
requires developed countries to "provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed" countries). Id. art. 66(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-37
(illustrating transitional periods in regard to patents).
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forego threats of unilateral sanctions in the pursuit of these stan-
dards.334 Article 71 of the Draft TRIPS Agreement establishes a
specialized policy review mechanism in conjunction with the gener-
al Trade Policy Review Mechanism that the Draft Final Act pro-
poses to institute.335 Periodic reviews under Article 71 could, in
principle, substitute for the unilateral policy reviews currently un-
dertaken by the trade representatives of the United States and the
European Community. If so, they would logically become a vehi-
cle for developed countries' efforts to obtain higher levels of intel-
lectual property protection "in the light of .. new developments
which might warrant... amendment of this Agreement. 336
Similar pressures concerning matters not yet covered by the
Draft Agreement could be exerted under Article 69, in which the
parties "agree to cooperate ... with a view to eliminating interna-
tional trade in goods infringing intellectual property rights. 337 The
attainment of higher standards in other negotiating forums, particu-
larly those that WIPO administers, would almost certainly trigger
trade-based initiatives to bring recalcitrant parties into line under
all these provisions. 38 Moreover, the Draft Understanding on Dis-
334. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 18, at 180, 197-203; infra note 360 and accompanying text.
335. See Draft Final Act, supra note 17, Annex IV, Agreement Establishing the
Multilateral Trade Organization, art. V(3); Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art.
71 (Review and Amendment); see also Victoria Curzon Price, New Institutional Develop-
ments in GATT, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 96-101 (1992).
336. Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 71(l); see also Jackson, supra note
16, at 22-23.
337. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 69 (International Cooperation).
For the ambiguities inherent in this use of the term "infringing," and the self-serving uses
made of it during the TRIPS negotiations, see Reichman, GAT Connection, supra note
8, at 769-96 ("Nonexistence of an International Norm Against Misappropriation").
338. See, e.g., WEGNER, supra note 23, at 26-34 (discussing WIPO's proposals for
a draft patent harmonization treaty); Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1st Sess., Questions
Concerning a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention Part I, Memorandum prepared
by the International Bureau, WIPO Doc. BCP/CE//2 (July 18, 1991); Committee of Ex-
perts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, 1st sess., Questions Concerning a Possible Protocol to the Berne Conven-
tion Part II, Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau, WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/I/3
(Oct. 8, 1991); Oman, supra note 23.
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putes expressly permits industrialized countries to complain about
acts that do not in themselves violate GATT undertakings.339 Such
complaints are likely to arise in regard to matters affecting the
scope of protection under the different intellectual property re-
gimes, which the Draft TRIPS Agreement seldom regulates in de-
tail.
In principle, if developed countries demand higher or more
expansive international minimum standards than those set out in the
Draft TRIPS Agreement, they should be prepared to pay additional
compensation to the developing countries for the resulting social
costs. This compensation would typically consist of trade conces-
sions enlarging market access. 34° Without such compensation, the
imposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the
name of "harmonization" remains today what Ladas deemed it in
1975, namely, a polite form of economic coercion.341
2. Pitfalls of the Dispute-Settlement Process
Meanwhile, both developing and least-developed countries
could experience real hardships in implementing agreed standards
under the pending TRIPS provisions, while the true social costs of
these provisions might exceed any trade concessions that are finally
negotiated, at least with respect to some of these countries.342 In
such an event, least-developed countries (as determined by the
appropriate United Nations schedules) could appeal for particular
consideration of their "special situation" under Article 22.1 of the
Draft Understanding on Disputes.343 In grave cases, least-devel-
339. See Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, art. 24; see also Curzon
Price, supra note 335, at 92 (noting that "GAiT jargon distinguishing between 'violation'
and 'non-violation' disputes ... allows the panel procedure to apply to disputes arising
from measures which do not formally violate GATT, but which do injure the trading
interests of one's partners"); Hudec, supra note 334, at 199-203 (noting that successful
outcome of Uruguay Round could depend on willingness of U.S. to renounce trade sanc-
tions for self-defined "unreasonable" restrictions on commerce not covered by GAIT
rules).
340. Accord Rowat, supra note 182, at 429.
341. 1 LADAS, supra note 152, at 14-15; see also Ullrich, supra note 7, at 158-59.
342. See, e.g., Dasgupta, supra note 83, at 855-58.
343. See Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, art. 22.1 (requiring that
"particular consideration shall be given to the special situation of least-developed coun-
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oped countries could resort to section B(l) of the Draft Final Act,
which overrides obligations inconsistent with the development
needs and capabilities of these countries.
Developing countries, in contrast, would want to invoke certain
articles in the Draft Understanding on Disputes that require con-
tracting parties to give "special attention to the particular problems
and interests of developing countries. 3 45 Developing countries
might also try to fall back on Article 71(1) of the Draft TRIPS
Agreement, in the hopes of obtaining a modification extending the
transitional period for those components of the Agreement respon-
346 eteCuclosible for the hardship in question. If, however, the Council on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, to be estab-
lished under Article 68 of that same Agreement, failed to resolve
the conflicting interests, a litigable dispute could arise that would
trigger the revised dispute settlement provisions of the Draft Final
Act.
347
In principle, the nature of a developing country's case could
vary with its status as plaintiff or defendant. Developing countries
that lodge complaints are automatically entitled to special consider-
tries" at all stages of the dispute-settlement process).
344. See Draft Final Act, supra note 17, § B(1) (Measures in Favour of Least-Devel-
oped Countries).
345. Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, art. 2.10; see also id. art. 10.12
(requiring GATT panel's report to "explicitly indicate the form in which account has been
taken of relevant provisions on differential and more-favorable treatment for developing
countries that form part of the General Agreement and of the instruments negotiated in
GATT under its auspices, which have been raised by the developing contracting party in
the course of the dispute settlement procedures").
346. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 71 (Review and Amendment).
Article 71(1) allows the parties to "undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new
developments which might warrant modification or amendment of this Agreement."
347. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, art. 68 (providing that a "Council
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights shall monitor the operation of
this Agreement and, in particular, PARTIES' compliance with their obligations hereunder,
and shall afford PARTIES the opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights"); Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra
note 17; Draft Final Act, supra note 17, § T (Elements of an Integrated Dispute Settle-
ment System) [hereinafter Integrated Dispute Settlement System]; see also JOHN H. JACK-
SON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 56-80 (1990); Curzon Price, supra note 335,
at 90-108.
1993]
260 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
ation for the economic impact of the measures in question on their
national economic development. 348 In contrast, when developing
countries are sued for breach of their TRIPS undertakings, they
must be prepared to shoulder the burden of proof and they will be
relegated to such differential and more favorable measures as the
Draft Final Act provides for each specific discipline it covers.349
No such measures appear in the Draft TRIPS Agreement other than
the transitional provisions and the special provisions for least-de-
veloped countries that have already been discussed.35 °
Notwithstanding this structural handicap, developing countries
in difficulty (whether plaintiffs or defendants) will want to show
good faith efforts to implement their TRIPS obligations, consistent
with their own development needs, and they will logically appeal
to the principle of differential and more favorable treatment en-
shrined in an Enabling Clause added to the GATT at the end of the
Tokyo Round. 351 The developed countries involved in the dispute
would reject both of these defenses. Developed countries would
argue for strict enforcement of the TRIPS obligations on the
grounds that the trade concessions they provided constituted a quid
pro quo for these very obligations. These countries would further
contend that the Draft TRIPS Agreement had omitted any differen-
tial and more favorable provisions for developing countries precise-
ly because these latter countries had waived or bargained away
their rights under the Enabling Clause in exchange for the market
348. See Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, arts. 19.7, 19.8.
349. See Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, arts. 1.8, 10.11, 10.12; see
also Curzon Price, supra note 335, at 107 (noting logical consequences of the "single
undertaking" principle underlying Draft Final Act).
350. See supra notes 333, 343-44 and accompanying text.
351. See Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 Nov. 1979, GATTl BISD, supra
note 1, at 203-05 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause], in Agreements Relating
to the Framework for the Conduct of International Trade, GATT, BISD, supra note 1,
203-18 (26th Supp. 1980); Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, art. 10.12
(quoted supra note 345); see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 84-88 (1987); Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, Differential and More
Favourable Treatment: The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488 (1980);
Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 816-22 ("Dualist Realities of International
Economic Life").
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access and other benefits flowing from the Draft Final Act as a
whole.352
While the responses of developing countries would vary with
the circumstances and nature of the complaint, in most cases they
would logically invoke the broad objectives and principles set out
in Articles 7 and 8 of the Draft TRIPS Agreement.353 As noted,
Article 7 declares that the "protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights should contribute to the promotion of techno-
logical innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technol-
ogy, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technologi-
cal knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." Article 8(1)
then specifies that parties may defend "the public interest in sectors
of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological devel-
opment."
To the extent that supervening events or changed conditions
frustrated the attainment of these objectives, the developing coun-
tries concerned could plead that Articles 7 and 8 had failed of their
essential purpose.35' If upheld, this claim could support appeals to
the nullification and impairment provisions of the GATT as well
as to the differential and more favorable treatment otherwise guar-
anteed by the Enabling Clause, which arguably springs back to life
if developed countries truly failed to realize the goals and princi-
ples set out in Articles 7 and 8.355 Given the right set of facts, a
developing country might strengthen its case by resort to Article
24.2 of the Draft Understanding on Disputes, which recognizes
claims for impeding the attainment of any objectives embodied in
the Draft Final Act.
356
352. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
353. See Draft TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 7-8; supra text accompanying
notes 143-46.
354. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 61(1), 62, in THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES-TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 53 (Ralf G. Wetzel
comp. & Dietrich Rauschning ed., 1978).
355. Cf., e.g., Hudec, supra note 334, at 199-203 (discussing nonviolation issues in
relation to Article XXIII of the GATI'); see also Enabling Clause, supra note 351.
356. See Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, art. 24.2 (exempting
objectives falling within Article XXIII of the GAIT).
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Predicting the outcome of such litigation would be risky under
the best of circumstances. If a developed country prevailed, it
could apply cross-retaliatory sanctions to goods unrelated to intel-
lectual property rights. 7  But the likelihood that GATT panels
would in fact ignore the special circumstances of any developing
country other than those Newly Industrialized Countries that had
graduated out of the Enabling Clause's protective embrace seems
speculative, indeed.35 8 For this and other reasons, the path of wis-
dom for all sides is to settle disputes arising under the TRIPS
Agreement by negotiated compromises premised on the twin no-
tions that developed countries must pay adequate compensation for
the social costs of the intellectual property regimes they seek to
impose and that the special circumstances of the developing coun-
tries must always be taken into account.359
Some developed countries may nonetheless continue to resort
to unilateral action notwithstanding the clear wording of the Draft
Understanding on Disputes with respect to the sanctity of multilat-
eral measures. 3 ° Such actions should be vigorously resisted, not
only to defend the integrity of a multilateral process that the devel-
oped countries demanded in the first place, 361 but also to avoid the
formulation of arbitrary and premature standards of international
intellectual property law that are likely to prove inefficient and
357. See Integrated Dispute Settlement System, supra note 347, arts. l(b), (f) (Sus-
pension-of Concessions); see also Curzon Price, supra note 335, at 95 (noting hostility
of developing countries to this provision).
358. See Enabling Clause, supra note 351, para. F. (graduation principle); HUDEC,
supra note 351, at 85-86 (reporting successful state action under this principle).
359. See Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 816-22, 864-69.
360. See, e.g., Draft Understanding on Disputes, supra note 17, arts. 1.1, 1.2, 21; see
also Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement: Interna-
tionalization or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAW. 795, 800-01 (1992) (advo-
cating continued but selective use of unilateral sanctions even after the conclusion of
Uruguay Round); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Combatting Piracy of Intellectual Property in
International Markets: A Proposed Modification of the Special 301 Action, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1991). For evidence that the U.S. intends vigorously to pursue
unilateral pressures prior to the successful conclusion of a TRIPS Agreement, see Shapiro
Tells Panel [Clinton] Administration Will Give 'Special 301' Fresh Direction, 10 INT'L
TRADE REP. 648-49 (1993).




To this end, the developing countries can take persuasive defen-
sive measures of their own if circumstances so require. The very
existence of a TRIPS agreement, for example, gives them a degree
of leverage they often lacked before in that the industrialized coun-
tries will obtain privileges and benefits they would be reluctant to
forfeit in some future conflict.363 If developed countries depart
from the principle of strengthening the system through multilateral
negotiations, developing countries may retaliate by threatening to
withdraw intellectual property rights conceded in the Uruguay
Round, not to mention cross-retaliatory options to which they also
become legally entitled. At the limit, developed countries that
press too hard should be prepared to see the developing countries
form a countervailing intellectual property "union" of their own,
once efforts to obtain a balanced compromise within the GATT
framework broke down or reached an unacceptable impasse.36
B. The Competitive Ethos in a Global Economy
The integration of intellectual property into international eco-
nomic law will require entrepreneurs in both developed and devel-
oping countries to reevaluate the nature of competition in a more
regulated global marketplace. While strengthened intellectual prop-
erty norms benefit inventors and creators everywhere, there is no
assurance that any particular countries will succeed in transforming
short-term trade advantages accruing from a TRIPS agreement into
solid and lasting commercial benefits. On the contrary, stronger
intellectual property laws will ultimately benefit those states whose
long-term development strategies best promote sustained technolog-
ical innovation and the effective transfer of basic research from
universities and laboratories to industry. 365 The future prospects of
the developed countries, including the United States, turn less on
the level of intellectual property protection as such than on the
362. See, e.g., Mody, supra note 71, at 225; Reichman, Electronic Information Tools,
supra note 191, at 455-61, 468-75; see generally I LADAS, supra note 152, at 15-18 (de-
picting harmonization as the product of a slow and gradual process).
363. See, e.g., Cottier, supra note 33, at 394.
364. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 890-91.
365. Cf., e.g., Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights, supra note 102, at 87-110.
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level of investment in basic research and in high-risk commercial
applications of the products it generates.
By the same token, the prospects for strengthened intellectual
property regimes operating in open markets will require developing
countries to formulate economic development strategies that are
consistent with the new legal order. To maximize their opportuni-
ties, developing-country authorities must foster and reward entre-
preneurship in general, while entrepreneurs in developing countries
must learn to think like small- and medium-sized firms in the in-
dustrialized countries. In time, affinities between small- and medi-
um-sized firms in both developed and developing countries will
outweigh the affinities between small and large firms operating
within any given national territory, and this transnational common-
ality of interests should strengthen the role of developing countries
in future multilateral negotiations. Meanwhile, the developing
countries will have to work harder to compete in general, and to
acquire technological improvements in particular, under a post-
TRIPS regime. However, if the appropriate strategies are adopted
in both the public and private sectors, any competitive efforts that
yield a foothold in the world market, and any effective transfer of
technology achieved in the process, should yield greater potential
returns than at present.366
In all countries, efforts to implement higher intellectual property
standards will put increasing strains on competition law, which is
not directly covered by the TRIPS Agreement. Identifying the
parameters of healthy competition valid for all players in an inte-
grated world market will thus become a pressing task for the inter-
national community in a post-TRIPS economic environment. 67
Because innovators, users, and second comers all have different
stakes in fashioning the rules of unfair competition law, their inter-
366. See also Reichman, supra note 24.
367.' See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 16, at 24 (stressing that monopolies "can undo the
trade liberalization effect of reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers"); see also John H.
Jackson, Statement on Competition and Trade Policy Before the U.S. Senate Committee
on the Judiciary (June 18, 1992), reprinted in 26 J. WORLD TRADE 110 (Oct. 1992);




ests will increasingly vary more with their economic roles than
with the geopolitical affiliations of their respective national states.
Developed countries that too aggressively promote the demands of
large, multinational corporations risk producing a competitive envi-
ronment inimical to the needs of their own small- and medium-
sized entrepreneurs. Developing countries that overly regulate
large foreign firms operating in their territories run the risk of suf-
focating their own small- and medium-sized firms.
Competition law must, accordingly, remain an integral part of
ongoing international discussions of intellectual property rights.368
In this context, developed countries must eventually take steps to
protect applied scientific know-how, which largely escapes the
patent and copyright systems, and they will continue to press the
developing countries to limit the pace at which second comers can
appropriate the fruits of investment in unpatented, noncopyrightable
innovation. 369  At the same time, the developing countries will
require the cooperation of the industrialized countries in formulat-
ing guidelines for the licensing of both patented and unpatented
technologies in order to effectuate transfers of technology without
unduly discouraging direct foreign investment.37° If, in future ne-
gotiations, the developing countries 'proved willing to exchange
greater short-term protection of products embodying unpatented
know-how for a commitment by the industrialized countries to
support an international Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Tech-
nology, it might open a new chapter in international unfair compe-
tition law. 371
Clearly, there is a great need for multilateral coordination and
cooperation to ensure that all voices are heard in a collective en-
deavor to achieve a market-wide balance between incentives to
create and reasonable opportunities to imitate and improve upon
technological innovation. Future discussions seeking to reconcile
368. See, e.g., Cottier, supra note 33, at 410.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 260-65; see generally Reichman, Legal
Hybrids, supra note 114.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72, 266-71; see also Experts Report on
UNCTAD's Draft Code of Conduct, supra note 143.
371. Cf. Reichman,GATT Connection, supra note 8, at 870-72, 875-78.
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the need for more effective transfers of technology with the drive
for greater economic efficiency will require a high level of techni-
cal expertise and a nonconfrontational environment conducive to
reasoned economic and social analysis. To the extent that coopera-
tion between developed and developing countries succeeds, it will
contribute a new perspective to the notion of fair competition that
should strengthen the prospects of all participants in the global
marketplace of the twenty-first century.
